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TORT REFORM, ONE STATE AT A TIME:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CLASS
ACTIONS AND COMPLEX LITIGATION IN
NEW YORK, ILLINOIS, TEXAS, AND FLORIDA
Adam Feit*
I. INTRODUCTION
The tort reform movement is part of a continuing debate
between corporate and insurance interests on one side and consumer
groups and plaintiffs' lawyers on the other.1 In the 1970s and early
1980s, various corporate interests began to attack the tort system at
the state level and advocate for what they termed "tort reform":
legislative measures aimed at limiting the availability and amount of
relief in personal injury actions.2 Arguing that these measures were
needed to reduce frivolous lawsuits and decrease insurance
premiums, proponents of the movement lobbied state legislatures to
limit non-economic and punitive damages, abolish joint and several
liability, and raise pleading requirements.3 Consumer interests and
plaintiffs' lawyers responded, with mixed success, by challenging the
constitutionality of these reforms in state courts. The opposition
utilized various state constitutional provisions such as due process,
equal protection, separation of powers, right to a jury trial, and
access to open courts.4
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Music, University of
Southern California, 2003. "For Kathia with Love and Squalor." With warm gratitude to Winston
Stromberg, Professor Georgene Vairo, Alec Johnson, and the editors and staffers of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review.
1. Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle over Tort Reform and the Overlooked Legacy of the
Progressives, 39 AKRON L. REV. 943, 943 (2006).
2. See id. at 944.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 944-95.
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During this early part of the "tort reform" era, federal courts
were not seen as a focal point for tort cases; instead, state courts saw
most of the action.5 But as mass tort litigation like asbestos began to
rise, the federal courts became a player in the tort arena.6 The
Federal Multidistrict Litigation Panel transferred mass torts for
pretrial purposes, and many perceived state courts to lack the
resources and procedures for resolving complex, multiparty,
multijurisdictional litigation.7 By the mid-1980s, federal courts were
considered a more appropriate place to resolve mass tort claims, and
plaintiffs' lawyers preferred federal suits because of the potential
class recovery with huge attorney's fees.8
However, after the Supreme Court decided Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor,9  along with Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'" and the summary judgment "trilogy,"'" it
became harder to obtain class certification in federal courts."2 Thus,
plaintiffs' lawyers returned to the states, seeking out specific state
courts that appeared more receptive to class certification and jury
trials. 3 Counties in certain states-particularly Illinois, Florida, and
Texas-became magnets for plaintiffs in certain forms of litigation. l"
5. See Georgene M. Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional Federalism: The Implications of the
New Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort Cases and Other Complex Litigation, 33 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1559, 1563 (2000).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric
of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79, 82 (1997).
9. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). Amchem establishes guidelines for when a class action can be
certified for settlement purposes only, and also questions the propriety of federal court class
resolution of mass tort litigation. Id. at 620, 629.
10. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert increases the power of federal judges to exclude relevant
expert testimony by investing them with a "gatekeeping" function to determine whether scientific
proof is reliable enough to be considered by the jury. Id. at 597.
11. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). These
three decisions advocate more liberal use of summary judgment in federal practice and provide a
more hospitable climate for bringing summary judgment motions. "Overall they tend to prevent
plaintiffs in certain kinds of cases, often tort actions based on state law," from getting to a jury to
prove liability. JoEllen Lind, "Procedural Swift: " Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law,
and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 769 (2004).
12. See Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional Federalism, supra note 5, at 1563-64.
13. See Georgene M. Vairo, Foreword: Developments in the Law, The Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 979, 981 (2006).
14. See id. at 982 n.l I (citing AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, at
8-9 (2004), available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2004/hellholes2004.pdf).
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This led to brutal forum selection battles between plaintiffs seeking
to keep cases in state court and defendants trying to remove them to
federal court. 5 Plaintiffs learned to defeat the right to removal by
naming non-diverse parties as defendants to destroy complete
diversity, and defendants learned to shed light on lawsuit abuse by
crowning certain counties as "judicial hellholes."' 6
In response to this dynamic, Congress enacted the Class Action
Fairness Act ("CAFA"). 7 States got the message and realized they
needed to clean up their acts, i.e., enact tort reform in response to
real or imagined lawsuit abuse. Thus, the tort reform movement that
began in the late 1970s and early 1980s is still alive and kicking.
With the Democrats in control of Congress as of this writing, further
national reforms with such broad impact as CAFA appear unlikely.
Accordingly, ardent advocates of tort reform from the business
community are returning to the states, where the tort reform
movement first took root. For example, groups like the American
Tort Reform Association, 8 a leading advocate for reining in class
action lawsuits, have turned their lobbying efforts away from
Congress and are now focused on lobbying state legislatures and
educating voters through sensationalist billboards.' 9
The stakes are high for states that fail to enact legislation to limit
the promulgation of lawsuits. They risk an exodus of national
companies and businesses that could move their headquarters to
greener pastures across state lines. Savvy businesses are reluctant to
base their operations in states where local laws do not protect them
15. Id. at 979.
16. See id. at 981-82.
17. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2007) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
CAFA broadens federal diversity jurisdiction and makes it easier for out-of-state defendants to
remove their cases to the federal courts, which many in the business community perceive to be
more sympathetic to their defenses. However, CAFA may not be helpful, depending on class
composition and other factors, when class actions are brought against businesses that are
incorporated or have their principal place of business in the state. Moreover, cases are only
assured of being removed when more than two-thirds of the plaintiffs are from out-of-state. For a
more detailed perspective on CAFA and pleading strategies, see Nicole Ochi, Developments, Are
Consumer Class and Mass Actions Dead? Complex Litigation Strategies After CAFA and
MMTJA, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 965 (2008).
18. The American Tort Reform Association is a national organization dedicated to reforming
the civil justice system through public education and the enactment of legislation. See Am. Tort
Reform Ass'n, About A TRA, http://www.atra.org/about.
19. Steve Lash, National 'Tort Reform' Group Shifting Efforts to States, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Jan. 5, 2007, at 1.
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from what they perceive to be frivolous lawsuits and unduly high
punitive damage awards." Corporate CEOs do not want their
companies to be located in so-called "judicial hellholes," where
judges supposedly favor plaintiffs and will certify any class that
walks in their courtroom." Accordingly, businesses may prefer to
relocate to so-called "business friendly" states that have special
forums for complex litigation such as business courts, which are
perceived to expediently handle business versus business litigation.22
In light of these considerations and the issues they raise, this
Article looks beyond California to present a brief snapshot of the
"climate" of class and complex litigation in four distinct states: New
York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida. These states were chosen for
analysis because they follow California as the next four most
populous states in the nation. In addition, the approach to tort
litigation and reform taken in these states plays an important role in
setting national standards and trends that are later mimicked by other
states. Before discussing the pertinent developments in each of the
chosen states, this Article briefly lays out some of the standards and
procedures for class actions and complex litigation in each specific
jurisdiction. This Article then discusses some of the latest
developments in the local legal landscape of each of these states and
the impact and implications of these developments on state court
litigation.
Part II introduces New York's approach to class and complex
litigation and explores how New York's business courts are used for
complex commercial litigation, considering whether they are a viable
alternative for complex commercial matters or just a hidden form of
tort reform. Part III discusses Illinois's standards for class and
complex litigation and focuses on the merits of the tort reform battle
against Illinois's perceived "judicial hellholes." Part IV summarizes
Texas's rigorous standards for class and complex litigation and
discusses how recent legislative reforms and runaway juries shape
class and complex litigation in the Lone Star State. Finally, Part V
explores Florida's efforts to undo its reputation as a "judicial
20. Id.
21. See infra Part III.C.
22. See infra Part II.C. 1.
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hellhole" and to create a litigation environment friendlier to the
domestic and international business communities.
II. NEW YORK
A. New York's Class Action Standards: Providing
"Therapeutic Benefits " to Consumers
New York's modern class action rules,23 adopted in 1975, are
derived from and are substantially similar to the federal standards.24
Emulating the federal policies of the 1970s that favored class actions
and liberal interpretations of their rules, New York intended their
modem class action standards to be more liberal and flexible than the
narrow class action legislation that preceded them.2" New York
followed the expansive federal attitude of that time because class
actions could play a desirable role in society by providing
"therapeutic benefits" and "due process."26
The "therapeutic benefit" theory holds that collateral public
benefits flow from allowing class actions.27 A class action is
perceived as a way to induce businesses and corporations to act in
both a socially and ethically responsible manor and to deter them
from implementing potentially harmful courses of action affecting
large numbers of individuals.28 Without the availability of class
actions, so the theory holds, these institutions operate virtually
unchecked, engaging in a form of "legalized theft" that occurs when
consumers are harmed but each consumer's damage is worth less
than $100.29 Since attorneys' fees effectively inhibit the filing of
individual suits based upon such small claims, class actions are seen
as the preferred deterrence for this "legalized theft."30
23. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901 (McKinney 2007).
24. Huebner v. Caldwell & Cook, Inc., 526 N.Y.S.2d 356, 359-60 (Sup. Ct. 1988). Federal
class action rules derive from FED. R. CfV. P. 23.
25. Friar v. Vanguard Holding Co., 434 N.Y.S.2d 698, 703 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) ("Under
earlier laws .. . class actions were viewed as requiring a sort of unity among class members
bordering on the nebulous concepts of 'privity' or 'joint tenancy."' (citations omitted)).




30. Ironically, defendants sometimes characterize a plaintiff's efforts to certify a class action
as "legalized blackmail." See Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co., No. 77 Civ. 1355-CSH, 1979 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9408, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1979). For a discussion of "negative-value" consumer
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The other theory persuasive in developing New York's class
action standards was the notion that class actions provide "due
process" by allowing many individuals a quasi-constitutional right to
litigate and participate meaningfully in the legal process.3'
Individuals might not exercise this right otherwise. If judges
construe these rules too narrowly, they basically deny access to the
courts for thousands of individuals whose minimal damages would
be greatly outweighed by the prohibitive costs needed to sue a
wealthy and powerful opponent.32  The New York legislature
believed judges were too restrictive and so adopted the modem rules
in 1975.
The New York legislature had both theories in mind while
drafting their modem class action rules in the 1970s.33  The
legislature understood that the future of the class action and its role
in society would depend on the judges who construed the rules
governing them." Class action certification requirements are so
flexible that reasonable minds can flex them to embrace or reject
certification.3 5 The New York legislature hoped its judges would
flex these requirements and embrace the once-broad federal approach
of allowing class actions. 6 It is unclear if this hope was realized.
1. Requirements for Class Certification in
New York Courts
In order to have a class action certified in a New York state
court, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving five requirements,
known as numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and
efficiency.37 Numerosity means that the proposed plaintiffs are so
numerous that it would be impracticable to use traditional joinder
claims, see Alec Johnson, Developments, Vioxx and Consumer Product Pain Relief: The Policy
Implications of Limiting Courts' Regulatory Influence over Mass Consumer Product Claims, 41
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1039 (2008).
31. Friar, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
32. See id. at 706.
33. See id. at 705.
34. See id. at 706.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(a) (McKinney 2007).
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rules to join them each individually.38 Commonality, considered the
"most troublesome" of the requirements in New York,39 refers to
whether the case involves common questions of law or fact that
predominate over questions affecting only individual plaintiffs."n If
these common questions of law or fact predominate over those
affecting only individuals, then it makes sense to combine all
plaintiffs into one class to hear their cases together. This does not
require that all proposed plaintiffs be identical, share a substantive
unity in a common interest, or that individual issues be nonexistent.4"
Nor do New York courts have a mechanical test for determining
commonality but instead consider the nebulous concept of "whether
the use of a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and
expense and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly
situated."42  Commonality can be a hard requirement to meet,
especially in product liability cases where damages or the proximate
causation of each individual's injuries may have to be determined on
a case-by-case basis. 3
Typicality and adequacy, the next two requirements,
contemplate the relationship between the named class representative
and the individual class members. Typicality is satisfied if the
claims of the class representative are typical of the claims of all the
class members.44 To that end, it is easily satisfied when all the
plaintiffs' claims are due to the same legal theory, but not when the
extent of damages for each individual has to be separately
38. Id. There is no set rule for the number of prospective class members which must exist to
certify a class. Friar, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
39. 434 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
40. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(a) (McKinney 2007). Commonality is also referred to as the
predominance requirement by some New York courts. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse,
683 N.Y.S.2d 179, 188 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
41. See Freeman v. Great Lakes Energy Partners, 785 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (N.Y. App. Div.
2004).
42. Friar, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (citation omitted).
43. See, e.g., Geiger v. Am. Tobacco Co., 716 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109-10 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
(denying certification in a suit against tobacco companies because individual issues of addition,
causation, and damages cannot be resolved on a common basis); Hurtado v. Purdue Pharm. Co.,
No. 12648/03, slip op. at 6 (N.Y. Jan 24, 2005) (denying certification in suit against
manufacturers and distributors of a pharmaceutical drug because of the predominance of
individual issues regarding the patient's dosage, reason for prescription, past history of narcotic
abuse and specific injury sustained).
44. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(a)(3) (McKinney 2007).
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established and investigated.45 Since the rules are designed to be
flexible, it is not necessary that the claims of the class representative
be identical to those of the class.46 Typicality can even be satisfied in
New York when the class representative cannot personally assert all
the claims made on behalf of the class.47
Next, the adequacy requirement inquires whether the named
class representative will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class members.48 New York courts consider three factors in
determining whether the proposed class representative meets this
standard: (1) whether conflicts of interest exist between the
representative and the class members; (2) the representative's
familiarity with the lawsuit and her financial resources; and (3) the
competence and experience of the class counsel.49 For example, a
class cannot be certified in New York if the representative is not
willing to bear the expenses of the class action,5" or if the
representative's interests are antagonistic or in conflict with those of
other class members.'
Finally, the requirement of efficiency considers whether a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. 2 This requirement considers the
public benefits society derives from class actions.53 These include
inducing wealthy institutions to engage in socially and ethically
responsible behavior, and deterring institutions from acting with
impunity since the realities of our legal system make it cost
prohibitive for plaintiffs who suffer relatively insignificant amounts
of damages to have their claims addressed. 4 New York courts
realize that a class action is not only superior but is indeed the only
economically viable means of redressing circumstances in which
45. Hurtado, No. 12648/03, slip op. at 7.
46. Pruitt v. Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc., 574 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
47. Id.
48. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(a)(4) (McKinney 2007).
49. Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 683 N.Y.S.2d 179, 194-95 (App. Div. 1998).
50. See Pruitt, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
51. See, e.g., Rivkin v. Kulzer GmbH, 734 N.Y.S.2d 31, 33 (App. Div. 2001) (reversing
class certification because the plaintiffs representing the class lacked damages).
52. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(a)(5) (McKinney 2007).
53. Pruitt, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
54. Id.
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numerous plaintiffs suffered relatively small economic injuries.5
However, a class action is not considered the superior method of
adjudication in New York for cases involving individual proof of
addiction,56 individual inquiries into reliance,57 or adjudication of a
controversy against a governmental body.58
2. Appellate Review of Class Certification
New York courts "liberally construe" the five requirements for
class certification.59 The trial courts have sound discretion to grant or
deny class certification, and any errors are generally resolved in
favor of allowing the class action to proceed.6" However, an order
granting certification should not be considered immutable.6' The
trial judge has discretion to sever certain issues from class status, to
divide the class into subclasses, or even to decertify the entire class.62
Many businesses and corporations are located within the state,
and New York courts often hear nationwide class actions against
locally based defendants on behalf of plaintiffs from across the
country. Despite the liberal approach towards certification
requirements, there are a number of inhibitors to the hearing of
nationwide class actions in New York courts. For example,
defendants may successfully avoid certification by making a motion
to dismiss the action on the grounds of forum non conveniens,63 a
forum selection clause,'M or a choice of law issue.65 Additionally, if
55. See, e.g., Jim & Phil's Family Pharmacy v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 707 N.Y.S.2d
58, 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
56. See Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 720 N.E.2d 892, 898 (N.Y. 1999).
57. See id.
58. LaCarruba v. Legis. of Suffolk, 640 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). A class
action against a governmental body fails to meet the "efficiency" requirement because
consolidation is simply not necessary. A successful individual challenge to a governmental body
changes the government practice at issue. All similarly situated individuals should then be
protected from the government practice at issue under the doctrine of stare decisis and because
government policies should apply equally to all citizens. See Jack E. Pace III, Note, Automatic
Stays and Governmental Operations: How New York State Protects the Government from the
Poor, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 137, 146-48 (1996).
59. Kidd v. Delta Funding Corp., 734 N.Y.S.2d 848, 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
60. Id.
61. Lauer v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 659 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
62. Id.
63. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 327 (McKinney 2008).
64. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(enforcing arbitration and choice of law clause, although arbitration before International Chamber
of Commerce is substantively unconscionable); Gates v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. 604141/02,
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the size of a proposed multistate class is too large, New York courts
may consider limiting the class to New York residents in order to
conserve judicial resources.66
Once the trial court has issued its order granting or denying class
certification, the order is immediately appealable by an interlocutory
appeal.67 Unlike the federal system and most other states, New York
gives parties the right to appeal almost any civil interlocutory order.68
By contrast, a federal court of appeals has discretion under Federal
Rule 23(f) to hear the interlocutory appeal of orders granting or
denying class certification.69
Also unique to New York is the almost nonexistent role that
New York's highest court plays in shaping the rules and standards of
class action litigation.7" The New York Court of Appeals, the state's
highest court, only reviews questions of law, except when the
Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court has reversed or
modified a judgment and made new findings of fact.7" Therefore, if
the appellate division affirms the trial court's ruling on class
certification and does not adopt new facts, the court of appeals has
no jurisdiction to review the class certification decision.
7 2
Accordingly, the appellate division plays a far more significant role
2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 751 (Sup. Ct. May 15, 2003) (enforcing Virginia forum selection clause
despite plaintiffs' assertion that Virginia law bars class actions).
65. See, e.g., Boss v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (N.Y. 2006)
(dismissing class action because contract contains a Minnesota choice of law clause); Goshen v.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 1190, 1196 (N.Y. 2002) (dismissing claims by out-of-state
plaintiffs).
66. See, e.g., Drizin v. Sprint Corp., 785 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (limiting
class certification to New York residents because the maintenance of a nationwide class would
require the unmanageable task of distilling the laws of the 50 states); Ackerman v. Price
Waterhouse, 683 N.Y.S.2d 179, 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (limiting class certification to New
York residents because plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving that choice of law
principles will not ultimately require the application of widely divergent laws of multiple
jurisdictions).
67. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5701 (McKinney 2007).
68. David Scheffel, Note, Interlocutory Appeals in New York-Time Has Come for a More
Efficient Approach, 16 PACE L. REV. 607, 607 (1996).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
70. The only recent and noteworthy court of appeals decision interpreting the standards for
class certification is Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 720 N.E.2d 892, 896-97 (N.Y. 1999).
71. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(b) (McKinney 2007).
72. See id.
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in developing the case law that interprets and modifies New York's
class action standards.73
B. An Overview of New York's Procedures for
Handling Complex Litigation
Though there is no exact definition for complex litigation, the
term broadly encompasses difficult or protracted actions that may
involve complex issues, related actions pending in different districts
or court systems, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or
unusual proof problems.74  As a result of their difficult and
demanding nature, complex cases need increased judicial supervision
and special mechanisms to handle the consolidation of related
cases. 75  New York has promulgated various programs and
procedures in response to these unique demands. These efforts
include a mechanism for coordinating related actions pending in
more than one judicial district, the implementation of an inactive
docket to administer the congestion of asbestos claims, and the
establishment of a specialized commercial court.
A common situation in complex litigation is one where related
cases are pending in more than one jurisdiction. 76 The transfer and
consolidation of such cases into one action for pretrial proceedings
gives a single judge the potential to expeditiously review similar
claims in an efficient manner.77 New York handles such situations
with a coordination mechanism analogous to the Federal
Multidistrict Litigation Statute ("MDL Statute").78 When related
cases require judicial management in New York, the Chief
Administrator of the Courts creates a Litigation Coordinating Panel
composed of one justice of the Supreme Court from each judicial
department. 7' This panel can coordinate related pending actions
73. See, e.g., Friar v. Vanguard Holding Corp., 434 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
74. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §§ 10.1, 10.11 (2004); see also
Scott Paetty, Developments, Classless Not Clueless: A Comparison of Case Management
Mechanisms for Non-Class-Based Complex Litigation in California and Federal Courts, 41 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 845 (2008).
75. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §§ 10.1, 10.123.
76. Seeid. § 10.123.
77. See Mark C. Weber, Managing Complex Litigation in the Illinois Courts, 27 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 959, 967 (1996).
78. The Federal Multidistrict Litigation Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, permits the transfer and
consolidation of related cases pending in federal districts throughout the United States.
79. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 22, § 202.69(b)(1) (2007).
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before one or more individual coordinating justices to handle all
pretrial proceedings, including dispositive motions.8" This panel has
been praised for smoothly and successfully managing mass tort cases
in New York.8
Uniquely, New York's coordination mechanism also attempts to
address the common situation of related cases pending in state and
federal courts.82 If there are such cases pending in federal courts or
even in the courts of other states, the panel instructs the coordinating
justice to consult with the respective judge(s) from these external
jurisdictions, in an effort to further the shared goals of coordination.83
The coordinating justice can even order discovery in New York cases
to proceed jointly or in coordination with the discovery in federal or
other states' actions.84
Another innovation effectively utilized by New York courts to
handle complex asbestos litigation is a "first in, first out" system of
docket management.85 This system defers the claims of unimpaired
plaintiffs to a separate deferred docket in order to allow the claims of
truly sick plaintiffs to be heard more promptly.86 In New York's
"first in, first out" system, plaintiffs affected by asbestos who do not
yet show signs of actual physical impairment do not lose the right to
have their cases heard, as the statute of limitations on their claims is
tolled while their case waits in the inactive docket.8 7 Once the
plaintiffs show sufficient physical impairment, their cases are
removed to the active docket and set for trial.88 Such a system
enables the efficient and equitable handling of dockets congested
with asbestos claims.
80. Id.
81. See Paul D. Rheingold, Prospects for Managing Mass Tort Litigation in the State
Courts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 910, 912 (2002).
82. See Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview of Multidistrict Litigation Rules at
the State and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47, 75 (2007).
83. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 22, § 202.69(c)(3) (2007).
84. Id. § 202.69.
85. Order Amending Prior Case Mgmt., In re N.Y. City Asbestos Litig., No. 40000/88, 2002
WL 32151568 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2002).
86. Dominica C. Anderson & Kathryn L. Martin, The Asbestos Litigation System in the San
Francisco Bay Area: A Paradigm of the National Asbestos Litigation Crisis, 45 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1, 8-9 (2004).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 9.
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1. The Supreme Court of New York's
Commercial Division
Last but not least, New York has created "business courts" in
many counties known as the commercial division, to handle complex
commercial disputes and commercial class actions. The commercial
division was founded because of the perception that business
litigants in New York avoided the state courts and preferred to have
their claims heard in the federal courts, the courts of Delaware, or
through private alternative dispute resolution.89 Since its founding as
a pilot program in 1993, the commercial division has been widely
praised as a success by both the bar and the business community,
expanding into several counties throughout the state. 90 Currently, the
commercial division handles cases that will involve significant
discovery and many motions because of the complexity of the issues
and the sums at stake. 91
The jurisdiction of commercial division courts broadly includes
tort claims for fraud and misrepresentation; business torts (e.g.,
unfair competition); breach of contract or fiduciary duty; statutory
and/or common law violations arising out of business dealings (e.g.,
violations of business agreements, trade secrets, restrictive
covenants, and employment agreements); UCC transactions;
shareholder derivative actions; commercial class actions; accountant
malpractice; legal malpractice in commercial matters; environmental
and commercial insurance coverage claims; corporate dissolution
matters; and arbitration applications.9 A monetary threshold, which
varies from $25,000 to $100,000 depending on the county in which
the court sits, must also be met, except in shareholder derivative
actions, commercial class actions, and dissolution claims.93
New York's is considered a model of success. It has
demonstrated that it can provide efficient, cost-effective, and timely
processing of commercial cases and has improved the quality and
89. Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and Jurisdiction of
Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAW. 147, 152 (2004).
90. See id. at 152-59.
91. Id. at 156.
92. See R. COMMERCIAL Div. SUP. CT. § 202.70(b) (2007), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/trialcourts/202.shtml#70 (setting forth the complete jurisdiction of
the commercial division).
93. Id.
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predictability of judicial decisions.94  Overall, the commercial
division is perceived as a preferable forum for resolving complex
business disputes and arguably has reversed the trend of business
litigants avoiding New York courts.95 Indeed, other states look to
New York's commercial division when contemplating their own
experiments in creating a specialized business court.96
There are commendable considerations that favor the
establishment of business courts like New York's commercial
division. 97 "Complex business cases are known to move at a glacial
pace, making it difficult for the businesses involved, and tying up the
court system for other litigants." 98  In theory, such cases can be
resolved more efficiently in a separate specialized docket. Having
complex cases heard by judges with a higher level of expertise in and
sensitivity to commercial matters may lead to more predictable and
consistent results.99
Nonetheless, hearing commercial claims in a separate docket
raises at least one important concern. As Mary Alexander, President
of the Consumer Attorneys of California, has said, "[c]ommercial
courts establish a two-tiered system of justice--one for the rich and
one for the average citizen."'' 0
2. Business Courts: Panacea for Complex Litigation
or Tort Reform in Disguise?
Despite some scholars' praise for New York's commercial
division, there is an equal body of criticism against the establishment
of state business courts. The chief complaint is that these specialized
courts provide an "elite form of justice" by creating a two-tiered
system that divides corporate litigants and average citizens.' A
94. Bach & Applebaum, supra note 89, at 158.
95. Id.
96. See generally Kimberly A. Ward, Getting Down to Business-Pennsylvania Must Create
a Business Court, or Face the Consequences, 18 J.L. & COM. 415, 432 (1999) (advocating for the
New York model to be considered if a business court is created in Pennsylvania).
97. See Sen. Ember Reichgott Junge, Business Courts: Efficient Justice or Two-Tiered
Elitism?, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 315, 319 (1998).
98. Id. at 316-17.
99. Id. at 317.
100. Elaine R. Friedman, New Business Courts Gain Acceptance, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 30, 1996-
Jan. 6, 1997, at BI.
101. Junge, supra note 97, at 318.
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court whose very function is to facilitate the state's commercial
enterprise could easily develop a bias in favor of commercial parties
or a bias against non-business litigants involved in commercial
litigation.
112
The justice rendered by business courts has the potential to
become questionable when these business courts decide claims
brought against businesses by individuals, as they are increasingly
doing in some states.0 3 Arguably, this scenario can readily happen
in a claim from an aggrieved employee, a claim of fraud or
misrepresentation, a consumer class action, or an insurance coverage
claim. The action itself may be "complex" and would benefit from
the managerial resources of a business court. Nonetheless, non-
business litigants may suffer prejudice in the hands of an elected
judge whose focus is to facilitate robust commercial activity in his
own community.
From the perspective of plaintiffs' attorneys, states like New
York created business courts to benefit or attract businesses, not to
benefit consumers or communities."° States do in fact scheme for
new ways to attract businesses to locate, incorporate within, and
remain within their state.0 5 Lately, these schemes often involve
legislative tort reform. Business courts could be viewed as one such
scheme. As proponents of New York's business courts argued,
establishing the commercial division fostered a more favorable
environment for attracting and maintaining business in New York,
which in turn enhances the economic wellbeing of the state. 6 Such
an outcome is clearly attractive to both the State and the business
community, but perhaps at the expense of individual litigants' rights.
It is interesting to note the approach to business courts taken by
California. After years of study and analysis, California decided
against the creation of business courts.0 7 California Court of Appeal
102. Id.
103. See Gary W. Jackson, Do Business Courts Really Mean Business?, TRIAL, June 2006, at
50-51.
104. See id.
105. But see Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law,
55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 683 (2002) (arguing against the notion that states compete amongst
themselves for businesses' incorporations).
106. See Robert L. Haig, Can New York's New Commercial Division Resolve Business
Disputes as Well as Anyone?, 13 TOuRO L. REV. 191, 196 (1996).
107. Bach & Applebaum, supra note 89, at 206.
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Justice Richard Aldrich, who chaired a task force looking into such
courts, noted "the only place we found support [for business courts]
was within the business community." ' California also found that
business courts are "elitist," taking the best judges and other
resources away from other courts and potentially favoring business
interests." 9 As an alternative, California established a complex court
system, which is probably the best alternative to a business court."0
As California's approach demonstrates, the ideal approach to
complex litigation should fairly balance the interests of both
consumer and corporate litigants, without a bias in favor of either
group.
If the stated goal of a business court is to allow businesses to
operate successfully in a state in order to attract other businesses,
then suits by consumers, employees, and other individually
aggrieved plaintiffs challenging the conduct of a business should not
be assigned to a business court."' But this potential conflict can
occur in New York because the jurisdiction of the commercial
division is so broad. Business courts should adjudicate disputes
arising between businesses, but claims brought by an individual
against a business 'inevitably create a potential for bias since the
court itself is specially designed to favor business activity. Further,
business court judges are selected for their backgrounds and
expertise in the field. In light of such circumstances, a non-business
litigant cannot fairly challenge the actions of a business in a court
specially designed to favor businesses.
III. ILLINOIS
A. An Overview of Illinois's Class Action Standards:
"The Last Barricade of Consumer Protection"
Like New York, Illinois acknowledges the utility of the class
action as a method of litigating complex common questions brought
by numerous claimants."2 Illinois courts perceive the class action as
108. Jackson, supra note 103, at 50.
109. Bach & Applebaum, supra note 89, at 207.
110. See generally Paetty, supra note 74.
111. See Jackson, supra note 103, at 54.
112. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 881 (11. 2005) (Freeman, J.,
dissenting) (citing Steinberg v. Chicago Med. Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634, 641 (Ill. 1977)).
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a potent procedural vehicle that adjudicates claims by multiple
persons without requiring individual court appearances. " ' Even
before Illinois adopted class action procedural statutes in 1977, its
courts allowed class actions and relied on common law to determine
the correct standards.'14
Illinois courts appear to welcome class actions even when the
size of the claim(s) or class is small." 5 For example, no defined rules
exist requiring a set number of putative plaintiffs." 6 Instead, courts
demand only that the potential number of class members be great
enough to render separate litigation impractical." 7 Illinois case law
also makes the class action available in cases involving small claims
because it benefits people whose claims are so small as to discourage
the filing of individual actions." 8  However, there are limits, and
courts deny class treatment where the recovery sought is "too trivial
to justify an imposition upon the administration of civil justice."" 9
Illinois also permits partial class actions. 2' A partial class
action is useful in mass tort claims when common issues like
individual damages do not predominate over individual issues. Thus,
Illinois achieves a modicum of judicial economy by certifying a class
as to only a few issues, preserving other aspects of the plaintiffs'
autonomy." ' In essence, this rule works as a partial consolidation
mechanism.'22 It is helpful when individual plaintiffs fear losing
113. Steinberg, 371 N.E.2d at 641.
114. Id. at 642. Under Illinois common law, a class action was only proper when there
existed a community of interest in the subject matter and a community of interest in the remedy
among all who made up the purported class. Moseid v. McDonough, 243 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1968).
115. See, e.g., Kulins v. Malco, a Microdot Co., 459 N.E.2d 1038, 1046-47 (I11. App. Ct.
1984) (affirming certification of class consisting of only nineteen members).
116. STUART T. ROSSMAN ET AL., CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS 118-19 (National Consumer
Law Ctr. ed., Supp. 2007).
117. See McCabe v. Burgess, 373 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Il1. App. Ct. 1978).
118. ROSSMAN, supra note 116, at 122; see also Smyth v. Kaspar Am. State Bank, 136
N.E.2d 796, 805 (111. 1956) (allowing class action instituted by owners of certificates of beneficial
interest against a bank).
119. Hayman v. Autohaus on Edens, Inc., 734 N.E.2d 1012, 1014 (11. App. Ct. 2000)
(dismissing class action where class representative's damages amounted to three days' interest on
$299).
120. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-802(b) (West 2003) (allowing the maintenance of class
actions with respect to particular issues, or divided into sub-classes where each sub-class is
treated as a class).
121. Weber, supra note 77, at 984.
122. Id.
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complete control over the litigation by joining a class and placing
their case exclusively in the hands of the lead class counsel.'23
Nonetheless, tort reformers have raised concerns about the
possibility of abuse of the class action vehicle, particularly in
Illinois.'14 The Illinois Supreme Court recognizes that some of these
allegations are leveled at its own courts,'25 and that these reformers
call parts of Illinois "judicial hellholes."'26 Though the class action
held an important position for Illinois's judiciary for over 100 years,
recent decisions by the Illinois Supreme Court appear to show a new
hostility toward the virtues of class-based litigation. For example,
the court has made certification requirements more difficult for
nationwide class actions.'27 However, one Illinois appellate court
recently reaffirmed its view that class actions are often the last
barricade of consumer protection.'28 In particular, this court noted
that consumer class actions provide restitution to the injured and
deterrence to the wrongdoer, thus attaining goals of equity and
justice.' 9 Nonetheless, the role that class actions will have in
Illinois, even as vehicles for consumer protection, will ultimately be
decided by the Illinois Supreme Court with some implicit direction
from Congress. It is an open question whether Congress's passing of
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005' 3o and the Illinois Supreme
Court's three decisions (that same year) limiting the availability of
Illinois courts to nationwide class actions are a mere coincidence.'
123. See id.
124. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing Illinois's so-called "judicial hellholes," which are
widely considered friendly to certifying and hearing nationwide consumer class actions).
125. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 881 (tll. 2005) (Freeman, J.,
dissenting).
126. See supra note 124.
127. See, e.g., Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 863-64 (reversing certification of a nationwide contract
class action on numerous grounds, and limiting class actions brought under the Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act to fraudulent transactions that take place within Illinois); Gridley v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 840 N.E.2d 269, 272 (Ill. 2005) (dismissing class action on forum non conveniens
grounds since named plaintiff was a citizen of Louisiana, events giving rise to the claim occurred
in Louisiana, and claim involved a violation of Louisiana law); Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848
N.E.2d 1, 32 (I11. 2005) (dismissing class action and reversing a $10 billion verdict against a
tobacco maker because the deceptive conduct at issue was authorized by a federal regulatory
body).
128. Walczak v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 850 N.E.2d 357, 371 (Ii. App. Ct. 2006).
129. Id.
130. Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
131. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the Illinois Supreme Court understood the message from
Congress: rein in your courts, or we will do it for you.
1. Requirements for Class Certification
in Illinois Courts
Illinois's class action statute essentially codified prior Illinois
case law.132 A class may be certified if the plaintiff establishes the
four requirements of numerosity, commonality, adequacy of
representation, and appropriateness."' The numerosity
requirement-whether the putative plaintiffs are so numerous that
joinder would be impracticable-depends on the particular facts of
each case.'34 Illinois courts have construed the state numerosity
requirement to follow federal practice in interpreting the rule because
of its similar language. 35
The commonality requirement'36 is determined in Illinois by the
"successful adjudication" test.'37 This test inquires whether the
successful adjudication of the named plaintiffs claim establishes a
right to recovery for the class members. 38 The mere existence of
some ancillary individual issues-such as separate determinations of
damages, multiple theories of recovery, or even the inability of some
class members to obtain relief because of a particular individual
factor-will generally not prevent the establishment of commonality
so long as these individual issues do not predominate over the shared
questions.'39
The adequacy of representation requirement 4 ' ensures that all
class members receive proper, efficient, and appropriate protection of
their interests in the litigation. 4' This requirement is met if the
132. Gordon v. Boden, 586 N.E.2d 461, 464 (111. App. Ct. 1991). Class certification is
governed by 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-801 (West 2003).
133. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-801 (West 2003).
134. In re Rosewell, 603 N.E.2d 681, 686 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
135. Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
136. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-801(2) (West 2003) ("There are questions of fact or law
common to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members.").
137. See Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 821 (Ill. 2005).
138. Id.
139. Purcell & Wardrope Chartered v. Hertz Corp., 530 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
140. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-801(3) (West 2003) ("The representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.").
141. Gordon v. Boden, 586 N.E.2d 461,466 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
918 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW [Vol. 41:899
named plaintiffs attorney is qualified, experienced, and able to
conduct the case. Further, the named plaintiffs interests cannot be
antagonistic to the interests of the class, and the case cannot be
collusive. 142
The final appropriateness requirement'43 considers whether a
class action best promotes uniformity and secures economies of time,
effort, and expense, or otherwise accomplishes ends of equity and
justice.1" Class actions are particularly appropriate when separate
suits could result in inconsistent standards of conduct for the
defendants or when a separate suit could affect the rights of the other
class members.145 A controlling factor in many evaluations of
appropriateness is whether a class action is the only practical means
for class members to have their claims redressed, especially if their
individual claims are small.'46
Taken together, Illinois's class certification requirements do not
appear stringent. To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs do not
have to conclusively establish all of the statutory requirements. A
complaint's factual allegations must only be sufficiently broad to
plead the possible existence of a class action claim.'47 When there is
doubt, Illinois courts are directed to err in favor of certifying a class
action.' These lenient standards likely contribute to the perceived
abuse of class actions in Illinois.
49
2. Appellate Review of Class Certification
Illinois trial courts have discretion to certify a class action, and
the state's appellate courts only reverse upon a showing that the trial
court clearly abused its discretion or applied impermissible legal
criteria. 5 °  Similar to the federal system, Illinois allows the
interlocutory appeal of a trial court order granting or denying class
142. See Spirek v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 382 N.E.2d 111, 119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
143. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-801(4) (West 2003) ("The class action is an appropriate
method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.").
144. Gordon, 586 N.E.2d at 467.
145. Rodriguez v. Credit Sys. Specialists, Inc., 308 N.E.2d 342, 347 (I11. App. Ct. 1974).
146. Gordon, 586 N.E.2d at 467.
147. Weiss v. Waterhouse Secs., Inc., 804 N.E.2d 536, 543-44 (I11. 2004).
148. Walczak v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 850 N.E.2d 357, 366 (I11. App. Ct. 2006).
149. See infra Part III.C (discussing the proliferation of class action filings in Illinois's
"judicial hellholes").
150. Walczak, 850 N.E.2d at 366.
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certification.151 However, this certification decision is not reviewed
de novo; rather, it is reviewed for abuse of discretion by the trial
court.
15 2
B. A Brief Overview of Illinois's Handling of
Complex Litigation
"Illinois has been the forum for a great deal of complex
litigation, and it is likely to continue to have this role in the
future."'53 A variety of factors explain why Illinois courts hear a
large amount of complex litigation and class actions. First, there is
the presence of sophisticated plaintiffs' firms in the state, especially
in Chicago where these firms tend to be headquartered.'54 Second,
certain counties, so called "judicial hellholes," award some of the
highest jury verdicts in the country.'55 Finally, Illinois has a liberal
long-arm statute.'56 Even if the events that led to suit did not occur
within Illinois, the presence of many national corporate and
industrial entities in the state minimizes personal jurisdiction
problems.'57
Illinois courts take a proactive approach to complex litigation
known as "affirmative case management."'58 Under this approach,
judges become active managers in order to keep costs and delays to a
minimum and shape the litigation into a form capable of
resolution.'59  When confronted with the difficult demands of
complex litigation, judges are instructed not to respond by modifying
case law doctrine or to press for the adoption of revolutionary
statutes or court rules. 6 ° Instead, Illinois judges are urged to
recognize the concept of affirmative case management as a matter of
151. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 306(a)(8) (2007); FED. R. Cfv. P. 23(f).
152. Weiss, 804 N.E.2d at 544.
153. Weber, supra note 77, at 962 ("Illinois was one of the first states to adjudicate a class
action in which many members of the plaintiff class did not reside in the state."). Miner v.
Gillette Co., 428 N.E.2d 478 (Ill. 1981), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 86 (1982).
154. Weber, supra note 77, at 963.
155. See infra Part III.C.
156. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-209(c) (West 2003) ("A court may also exercise
jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by-the Illinois Constitution and the
Constitution of the United States.").
157. Weber, supra note 77, at 963.
158. Id. at 966.
159. Id,
160. Id.
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attitude and sound practice, "a science more practical than
doctrinal."''
1. Case Consolidation
Illinois provides a consolidation mechanism that allows the
court or litigants to take initiative and secure the advantages of
simplified, consolidated proceedings before a single Illinois court. 62
Under this mechanism, transfer and consolidation of cases is
appropriate when cases involving one or more common questions of
fact or law are pending in different judicial circuits within Illinois,
where transfer and consolidation would serve the convenience of the
parties and witnesses, and where such action would promote justice
and efficiency.'63 The Illinois Supreme Court, which plays a
supervisory role in reviewing and approving consolidations, may act
on its own motion or that of any party." An order of transfer and
consolidation may include pretrial, trial, or post-trial proceedings.'65
Like New York, Illinois allows for limited coordinated
discovery when there are similar cases pending in state and federal
court."'66 Illinois judges are free to contact judges in the federal or
other state systems, so long as they do not delegate any authority
over the case to a non-Illinois judge.'67
2. The Circuit Court of Cook County's
Commercial Calendar
Cook County, the home of Chicago, has its own business court
to handle complex business disputes.'68 Known officially as the
Circuit Court of Cook County Commercial Calendar, the court was
designed to enhance the commercial climate of Cook County by
providing special expertise in the area of commercial litigation and
priority scheduling for the disposition of commercial disputes.'69 The
commercial calendar hears cases-whether based upon theories of
161. Id.
162. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 384 (2007).
163. Id.
164. Weber, supra note 77, at 965.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 975-76.
167. Id. at 976.
168. Bach & Applebaum, supra note 89, at 160.
169. Id.
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tort, contract, or otherwise-that involve a commercial relationship
between the parties.17 The amount of monetary damages sought
must be in excess of $30,000.'71 The commercial calendar's
approach to cases differs from that of other Cook County courts.
The other courts use a master calendar system in which certain
judges address various pretrial matters and different judges handle
the trials.1 2  In contrast, an individual judge presides over every
phase of cases in the commercial calendar, from start to finish.'73
According to former Presiding Judge Judith N. Cohen, the
commercial calendar has been tremendously well received by
commercial litigators.'74 The court's eight-judge contingent hears
roughly 4,500 new cases a year.'75 By regularly handling
commercial disputes, the judges "have learned and developed an
expertise in commercial law."' 7 6  Presumably, this creates more
expeditious and fair results.
C. New Developments in Illinois Class Action Law: Judicial
Hellholes and the Campaign for Tort Reform
Illinois presents a prime example of an interesting development
in the movement for tort reform. Advocates for reform, like the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and the American Tort Reform Association
("ATRA"), want to limit class action lawsuits, rein in exorbitant
punitive damage awards, and educate voters about electing state
legislators, attorneys general, and judges "who endorse a free-
enterprise system that lets companies operate without fear of large
punitive awards or excessive government restraint."'77  With
Democrats in control of Congress, chances are slim for passing more
national tort reforms like CAFA. Thus, corporations and businesses
170. Circuit Court of Cook County Commercial Calendar, http://www.cookcountycourt.org/
divisions/law/CommercialCalendars.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
171. General Order of the Circuit Court of Cook County 2.1 (a),
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/rules/orders/general_orders.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
172. Bach & Applebaum, supra note 89, at 160.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 161.
175. Id. at 164. Cook County also has a Chancery division that often hears class actions and
complex business cases. Id.
176. Id. at 165.
177. Lash, supra note 19, at 1.
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are compelled to focus their lobbying on state capitals and the courts
of public opinion.178
These attempts to court public opinion and educate voters about
the goals of tort reform are tangible in Illinois. For example, ATRA
declared war on the use of class actions in Illinois. 7 9 ATRA deemed
Illinois's Cook, Madison, and St. Clair counties as some of the worst
jurisdictions in the country for lawsuit abuse. 8' To emphasize its
point, ATRA designated these counties "judicial hellholes."''
What is a "judicial hellhole"? According to ATRA, it is a place
"where judges systematically apply laws and court procedures in an
unfair and unbalanced manner, generally against defendants in civil
lawsuits." '182 It is a court system in which weaknesses in evidence are
overcome by pretrial and procedural rulings;'83 where judges proceed
even though the plaintiffs, defendants, witnesses, and events in
question have no connection to the jurisdiction;'84 where product
identification and causation are irrelevant because the jury will
undoubtedly return a verdict: in favor of the plaintiffs;'85 where
plaintiffs need not be injured to receive damages;'86 and where class
actions are certified without meeting the rigors of commonality.'87 In
other words, a '"judicial hellhole" is a jurisdiction perceived as unfair
178. Id.
179. See AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2006 (2006), available at
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2006/hellholes2006.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL HELLHOLES
20061.
180. American Tort Reform Association, http://www.atra.org/reportslhellholes/ (last visited
Oct. 24, 2008).
181. At the time this Article was written, ATRA's most recent release of its Judicial Hellholes
series was from 2006. Recently, ATRA released its 2007 edition, which lowers Madison and St.
Clair Counties from "judicial hellhole" to "watch list" status due to a substantial drop in filings of
class actions. AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES iv (2007),
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2007].
182. JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2007, supra note 180, at ii.
183. JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2006, supra note 179, at 1.
184. Id.
185. See generally, Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 52 (111. 2005), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 685 (2006). The Illinois Supreme Court questioned the trial court's treatment of the
causation issue after vacating a $10.1 billion judgment against big tobacco, the largest judgment
in state history. Id.
186. JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2006, supra note 179, at 1.
187. See, e.g., Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 863-64 (Ill. 2005),
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1003 (2006) (overturning SI.2 billion dollar verdict and decertifying
nationwide class that included class members whose insurance claim proceedings took place
outside of Illinois).
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toward business and corporate defendants. When these defendants
fall into a "judicial hellhole," they lose not because they are legally
culpable but because they have deep pockets and because the threat
of being subject to the jurisdiction of the "judicial hellhole" will
force them to settle.
On the other hand, some plaintiffs' lawyers consider these
courts to be "magic jurisdictions" because of their tendency to award
large jury verdicts.'88 ATRA believes that "[p]ersonal injury lawyers
are drawn to these jurisdictions like magnets and look for any excuse
to file lawsuits there."' 89 As one former Madison County judge said,
"[w]hen people come from hither and thither to file these cases,
there's gotta be an inducement, doesn't there? They're not coming
to see beautiful Madison County." 9 ' Indeed, Illinois courts do see a
fair share of class actions without merit 9' and lawsuits that the local
media portray as wacky.'92
Illinois has three "magic jurisdictions" or "judicial hellholes,"
depending on one's perspective.'93 The rulings of these courts are
important because they have national implications beyond the county
in which the judge sits. When an Illinois judge sitting in St. Clair
County decides a suit involving parties from across the country, the
Judge may be regulating an entire national industry.'94 This scenario
188. JUDICIAL IELLHOLES 2006, supra note 179, at 1.
189. Id.
190. Hon. J. John DeLaurenti, JUDICIAL HELLHOLEs 2006, supra note 179.
191. See, e.g., Fisch v. Loews Cineplex Theaters, Inc., 850 N.E.2d 815 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005)
(class action against movie theater alleging movie previews last too long).
192. See Steve Schmadeke, Woman Drinks Acid, Sues, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 17, 2007, at 3;
Steven Schmadeke, Woman Says Golf Ball Hit Her, Sues Course, Golfer, CHI. TRIB., July 27,
2007, at 2; Steve Schmadeke, Woman Who Hurt Her Ankle Sues Bar, CHI. TRIB., July. 23, 2007,
at 9; Carolyn Starks, 2 Counties Sued Over Failure to Locate Dying Motorcyclist, CHI. TRIB.,
July 10, 2007, at 5.
193. These are Cook, Madison and St. Clair Counties. See supra text accompanying notes
179-81.
194. See, e.g., Ann Knef, Lakin Files Class Action Against State Farm in St. Clair County,
RECoRD, June 7, 2006, available at http://www.madisonrecord.com/news/180199-lakin-files-
class-action-against-state-farm-in-st.-clair-county. This case involves a class action against State
Farm Insurance for wrongfully subrogating medical payment claims instead of allowing
individuals to recover from third parties in auto accident claims. The lead plaintiff is an Illinois
resident who died in an auto accident in Missoui. Missouri does not allow the medical payments
to be subrogated, and State Farm allegedly violated this law when it made a subrogation claim for
the plaintiffs medical payments. The putative class includes all residents of Illinois.
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is a serious concern when class actions are filed in Illinois for tactical
reasons on behalf of people who do not even live in Illinois.' 95
Nonetheless, in a series of decisions from the pre-CAFA era, the
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that state courts, like Illinois's "judicial
hellholes," are competent to hear nationwide class actions.
Beginning in the late 1960s, the Court first made it harder for federal
courts to hear class actions based on diversity jurisdiction, unless a
question of federal law was involved.' 96 Then, the Court decided in
1985 that state courts can handle class actions involving the
nationwide marketing of goods and services and that state courts
have jurisdiction over non-resident class members in class actions
seeking money damages when an opt-out form of notice is used.197
More recently, the Court held in 1996 that a state court has the power
to approve the settlement of a nationwide class action releasing
claims that were never filed and that were solely within the
jurisdiction of a federal court.'98 As such, in the pre-CAFA era, the
Court approved the filings of class actions with nationwide impact in
the small counties of Illinois, though they were probably filed in
Illinois for tactical reasons. Congress, on the other hand, does not
appear to approve of these filings and hopes that CAFA will end the
adjudication of nationwide class actions in small Illinois counties.'99
1. Connecting Class Actions to Illinois's
Economic Woes
Regardless of whether one considers the proliferation of class
actions in Illinois to be a form of civil justice or judicial abuse,
ATRA hopes to convince the local citizens of the need to rein in
plaintiffs' lawyers. To achieve this effort, ATRA initiated a
195. See e.g., Ann Knef, Out-of-State Plaintiffs Take on Bextra in St. Clair County, RECORD,
Jan. 24, 2006, available at http://www.madisonrecord.com/news/173752-out-of-state-plaintiffs-
take-on-bextra-in-st.-clair-county. The Bextra case is a class action against major pharmaceutical
manufacturers filed on behalf of Kentucky, Tennessee and Alabama residents. The class contains
no Illinois residents. However, venue is proper in St. Clair County, Illinois, because Monsanto,
one of the defendants, operates a plant there. Id.
196. In Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), the Court held that each class
member must individually meet the jurisdictional amount, and in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969), the Court disallowed the aggregation of claims for purposes of meeting the requisite
dollar amount for federal diversity jurisdiction. Taken together, these decisions effectively
relegated class actions involving state law to the state courts.
197. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 820-21 (1985).
198. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996).
199. See infra Part II1.C.2.
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campaign of sensationalist propaganda aimed directly at the hearts
and minds of voters. With this campaign, ATRA hopes to instill in
Illinois voters' minds the idea that class actions are to blame for the
state's economic woes. For example, there is a billboard outside the
minor league ballpark of the Schaumburg Flyers that depicts an
injured ballplayer and the words "Lawsuits Outta Leftfield Help Put
Illinois' Economy on the Disabled List.
200
An interesting aspect of this new campaign for tort reform in
Illinois is that ATRA is reaching out to voters and trying to sway
public opinion, rather than lobbying the members of the state
legislature. To press their claim on the local public, ATRA uses
"rolling billboards," trucks with slogans and signs slamming
personal-injury lawyers.2"' One such billboard depicts a vampire's
teeth dripping dollar signs along with the words "lawsuit abuse.
'20 2
In another, a license plate labels Cook County as the "Land of
Lawsuits.123 Above all, ATRA hopes these billboards will remind
Illinois citizens that "as workers, consumers and taxpayers, they
continue to foot the bill for the economy-sapping shenanigans of
shameless personal injury lawyers. 2 4
According to the presiding judge of the Cook County Law
Division, a so-called "judicial hellhole," the billboard campaign is
"juvenile. '2°5 "Sensationalism is all they're looking for ... I'd like
to see something rational," says Judge William D. Maddux." 6 Most
troubling to Judge Maddux is the media's and tort reformers' abuse
of the significance of large runaway verdicts.2 7 In fact, most
runaway verdicts get cut down: "down the road when rationality
200. Press Release, Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, ATRA's New Ballpark Billboard Condemns
"Lawsuits Outta Leftfield" (May 25, 2007), http://www.atra.org/show/8124.
201. Pat Milhizer, Business Group Revs Up Campaign Criticizing Courts Here, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Oct. 24, 2006, at 1.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Press Release, Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, supra note 200. For the opinion of a Chicago
based litigator who represents pharmaceutical companies and other businesses, see Michael J.
Wagner, Impact of Product Liability Issues on Innovation, Address Before the Canada-United
States Law Institute (Apr. 7-8, 2006), in CAN.-U.S.L.J., 2006, at 263, 279 (discussing how
corporate liability has a negative impact on product innovation). The local companies Michael
Wagner represents are reluctant to develop new products or services because of potential liability
lawsuits. Id.
205. Milhizer, supra note 201, at 1.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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prevails ... something is done to those verdicts to put them back in
line."2"8 Unfortunately, the media does not accurately convey this.
After Cook County was designated a "judicial hellhole," Judge
Maddux asked the court clerk for some empirical data to determine
what was happening in his court system.2 9  The data showed that in
2004, 51 percent of jury verdicts favored plaintiffs, and 49 percent
were for defendants.210 In 2005, two out of three motions to transfer
a case out of Cook County were granted.2 1' These figures seem fair
and reasonable, though in 2000 plaintiffs did win 66 percent of
verdicts, compared to 34 percent for defendants.2 2 Nonetheless,
Judge Maddux is satisfied with the fairness reflected in these figures
and thinks groups like ATRA "are just not interested in the truth.
213
2. CAFA and Judicial Hellholes
If the truth is out there, it will not be found in ATRA's annual
reports on "judicial hellholes." 24  However, ATRA's efforts to
showcase the negative implications of hearing national class actions
in state courts led to the tort reform movement's greatest recent
success, the passing of CAFA. CAFA's purpose is to shift a portion
of class action litigation from state to federal courts,1 5 where there is







214. ATRA's Judicial Hellholes Reports are available at http://www.atra.org/reports/
hellholes/. Although extremely entertaining to read, these annual reports are pure propaganda
filled with half-truths and manipulated misconceptions about our justice system. For example,
the reports often portray state courts hearing claims by out-of-state plaintiffs to be an absurdity,
without explaining that principles of personal jurisdiction require suits to be heard in states where
the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants, not the plaintiffs. Also, the reports often
discuss the filings of newsworthy "frivolous" lawsuits, with citations to local newspaper articles
as their sources. A minimal amount of further research, such as reading the newspaper articles
(not all of them actually exist), often shows that these cases were eventually dismissed,
withdrawn, removed to federal court, or reversed. The reports rarely discuss the subsequent
history of these newsworthy cases.
215. See generally Barbara L. Jones, Study Reports Act Serves Its Purpose: Moving Class
Actions, KAN. CITY DAILY REc., Oct. 25, 2006 (summarizing the conclusion of a study
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center).
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certification. 2 6 The certification question is paramount to defeating a
class action. As one longtime class action defense attorney put it: "if
you win on certification, you win. "217 Because it is easier for
plaintiffs to certify a class action in state court, defendants often
spend a lot of money to remove the case to federal court if they think
they can win on certification.218 The majority of class actions filed in
federal courts are either dismissed or withdrawn.2 9  Furthermore,
only 20 to 40 percent of cases filed as class actions are actually
certified.22° Once certified, class actions are settled before trial 90
percent of the time.221
Empirical evidence shows CAFA has successfully brought more
state-law diversity class actions into the federal courts.222 Federal
diversity class action filings have increased by more than 300 per
year, compared to pre-CAFA levels.223 The majority of this increase
are state-law contract and fraud claims, types that were heard in state
courts in the pre-CAFA era. 24 Still, it will take a few years until we
have enough state and federal appellate decisions to see how CAFA
reforms the state class action landscape. It is also unclear whether
CAFA deters some cases from being filed at all or are instead filed as
single-state cases.
CAFA proponents believed that resource-deficient state judges
were handling too many class actions and that it made better sense to
hear national cases in the federal system.225 Although these are valid
arguments, plaintiffs' attorneys speculate that there are hidden
agendas behind CAFA. One possible motive is to eliminate class
216. See Bob Yates, Class Action Fairness Act, More Than a Year Later, CHI. LAWYER, Dec.
2006, at 54.
217. Id. at 69 (quoting Anthony Rollo of McGlinchey Stafford, a longtime class action
defense attorney).
218. Id.
219. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION




222. THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION
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actions entirely. 226  If that cannot be accomplished, plaintiffs'
attorneys predict that Congress will at least "force them all into one
forum which can be managed [more easily] than cases brought in
different state courts.22 7 Some believe the goal of CAFA is "to blow
up the caseload in the federal court system, so that cases [will] move
more slowly, if at all. '28 Similarly, civil rights groups are concerned
that federal courts will be overwhelmed with class actions that were
once handled by state courts and will become too busy to hear
federal antidiscrimination lawsuits. 9
Plaintiffs' attorneys, consumer advocacy groups, and skeptics
also believe that a movement to grant the business community broad
immunity from consumer liability lies behind CAFA and the
campaign against "judicial hellholes." Joanne Doroshow, a
prominent consumer advocate, has called ATRA's campaign one
example of the "tremendous increase in efforts to eviscerate the civil
justice system and make sure that corporations do not get sued for
anything they do wrong. "230
Nonetheless, one positive result of ATRA's campaign is that it
offers the opportunity to learn about important issues that all
informed citizens should consider. Citizens should understand the
proper role of state courts in their communities. These courts exist to
protect individual rights, limit government power, and redress
economic and physical injuries. Moreover, citizens should
understand that the filing of a class action is much more than an
ATM for plaintiffs' lawyers. Rather, class actions can be a vehicle to
protect consumer rights, regulate unscrupulous conduct by
businesses, and compensate victims for the injuries of a mass tort.
Even CAFA begins with the finding that "[c]lass action lawsuits
are an important and valuable part of the legal system when they
permit the fair and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of
numerous parties. 231 Class actions eliminate or reduce the threat of
repetitive litigation, prevent the inconsistent resolution of similar
cases, and provide an effective means of redress for individuals
226. Id.
227. Id. at 69 (quoting Clinton Krislov, a plaintiffs class action attorney).
228. Id. at 55 (quoting James Sturdevant, a plaintiffs class action attorney in San Francisco).
229. Joanne Doroshow, Speaking Truth to Power, TRIAL, July 2004, at 20, 22.
230. Id. at 20.
231. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1711 (a)(1) (2007).
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whose claims are too small to make it economically viable to pursue
them as independent actions.232 At their best, class actions help
control conduct that threatens to harm society or the marketplace.233
For example, securities and consumer class actions enforce
regulatory standards designed to control or deter fraudulent
marketplace conduct that might otherwise escape regulation. 234  At
their worst, however, class actions are a vehicle for plaintiffs'
attorneys to obtain hefty paychecks out of corporations that would
rather settle than go through the expense and risk of a trial. Such
class actions inspire sensationalist tort reform campaigns with the
danger to mislead and misinform the public.
Although there have been problems with lawsuit abuse in
Illinois, the disproportionate filing of nationwide class actions in
Illinois's "judicial hellholes" is not a complete explanation for the
loss of manufacturing jobs in Illinois.235 Many other factors should
be considered, such as the importation of cheaper goods from abroad,
rising energy costs, the devaluation of the dollar, and the
international credit crunch crisis. In light of the many domestic
problems the United States now faces, blaming plaintiffs' lawyers for
the economic slump of Illinois is misguided. The Achilles heel of
tort reformers like ATRA is the self-interest behind their message.
Reform groups try to conceal the identities of their financial
sponsors, usually tobacco and insurance companies, because they
know how much the public distrusts those companies. 236  As their
self-interest is uncovered, proponents of tort reform lose the
credibility they need to persuade voters and legislators to enact their
proposals.
232. AM. LAW INST., PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMPLEX LITIGATION 35 (1987).
233. ROTHSTEIN & WILLG1NG, supra note 219, at 1.
234. Id.
235. Former Illinois State Treasurer Judy Baer Topinka argued that outsized damage awards
send a message that Illinois is hostile to business. Topinka told reporters "[w]ith three of the six
worst counties for litigation abuse right here in Illinois, it should come as no surprise that
companies like Honda are choosing to expand their operations and build new plants in other
states." JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2006, supra note 179, at 18.
236. Doroshow, supra note 229, at 22.
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IV. TEXAS
A. An Overview of Texas's Class Action Standards:
A "Rigorous Approach"
Compared to other states like New York and Illinois, Texas
courts take an admittedly more "rigorous approach" to the issue of
class certification. 37 This rigor is apparent in both attitude and
procedural process. Though Texas may consider the class action an
"efficient device," its courts do not recognize a right to litigate a
claim as a class action.238
A Texas court may certify a class action only if the plaintiffs
satisfy all the statutory requirements,239 but Texas judges will not
certify a class action simply on the basis of a well-pleaded petition. 4°
Instead, a hearing on the issue of certification is always held.24' In
this hearing, the proponents of a class action have the burden of
proving to the court all of the statutory elements of certification.242
Furthermore, the court must perform a "rigorous analysis" when
considering whether to certify the class.243 Thus, a Texas court is
required to look beyond the pleadings and understand the parties'
claims, defenses, relevant facts, and even the applicable substantive
law in order to make a meaningful determination of certification
issues.244 This analysis means that in deciding whether to certify a
class, a Texas court will consider more than just the petition and
answer, instead evaluating the ultimate merit of the claims and
defenses.245 Moreover, a court is not bound by the class definitions
submitted by the parties. Overall, Texas's trial courts have broad
discretion to independently define the class based on the available
evidence, and the state's appellate courts can redefine the class to
correct any infirmities. 4 6
237. Stobaugh v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 105 S.W.3d 302, 311 (Tex. App. 2003).
238. Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon, 22 S.W.3d 444, 452-53 (Tex. 2000).
239. Id.
240. ROSSMAN, supra note 116, at 279.
241. TExR. Civ. P. 42(c)(1).
242. Bailey v. Kemper Cas. Ins. Co., 83 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. App. 2002).
243. Schein v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 689 (Tex. 2002).
244. See Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Hankins, 111 S.W.3d 69, 72 (Tex. 2003).
245. ROSSMAN, supra note 116, at 280.
246. Bailey, 83 S.W.3d at 848.
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Texas imposes even higher certification burdens on proposed
nationwide class actions filed in the state. When the laws of other
states are implicated, the Texas Supreme Court doubts a trial court's
ability to accurately determine the merits of certification.247 This
view undermines the viability of nationwide classes filed in the state
because a determination of the applicable substantive law is of
paramount importance in such actions."' Class representatives are
required to present Texas trial courts with an extensive analysis
evaluating differences in the various states' laws.249 Texas courts are
then independently responsible to determine whether Texas law
conflicts with the laws of another state.25° They must analyze and
decide all conflict-of-law issues before granting certification. 5'
Unless the courts conduct a detailed state-by-state analysis of any
conflict-of-laws, their certification order will be reversed.252
Also indicative of their general attitude toward class actions, the
Texas Supreme Court expressly rejects a "certify now and worry
later approach," instead requiring lower courts to perform a rigorous
analysis before allowing a case to proceed as a class action.253 As
such, Texas trial courts must resolve all dispositive issues that impact
the viability of the case before even considering certification. 4 In
addition, courts must include a "trial plan" with their certification
order.255 This plan allows reviewing courts another opportunity to
assure that all statutory requirements were satisfied and that the trial
court fulfilled its obligation to rigorously analyze and understand all
of the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive
law. 256
With all of this skepticism and rigor, Texas does not appear to
be as friendly to the class action device as New York and Illinois. In
fact, the Texas Supreme Court appears to be far less sympathetic to
247. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Co. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. 2004).
248. Id. at 672.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 673.
25L. Id. at680.
252. See id. at 672-73.
253. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Dearing, 240 S.W.3d 330, 346 (Tex. App. 2007).
254. Id.
255. Id. The trial plan requirement is codified in TEX. R. CIrv. P. 42(c)(1)(D).
256. Tex. Parks & Wildlife, 240 S.W.3d at 346.
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the general argument that denial of class treatment effectively denies
legal redress to numerous plaintiffs because their claims are simply
too small to justify the cost of individual litigation. The court's
response has simply been that "there is no right to litigate a claim as
a class action. '257  The Texas Supreme Court's notions of fairness
and justice are only predicated on strict compliance with the
standards of certification.258 Noticeably absent from Texas Supreme
Court opinions is any language demonstrating that the class action
device deters wrongful corporate behavior.
1. Requirements for Class Certification
in Texas Courts
Texas's class action standards are almost identical to the federal
standards, 259  and indeed, federal decisions determining class
certification serve as "persuasive authority" within Texas courts.
26 °
In order to certify a class in Texas, the plaintiff must establish the
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
of representation.261
The requirement of numerosity is not difficult to meet,262 and
Texas law does not require precise proof of the number of putative
class members.263 The standard for commonality264 is also not high in
Texas.265 Common questions are questions that when answered as to
the named plaintiff, are answered for all the class members.266  The
presence of a single common question of either law or fact can
warrant class certification.267
257. Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 439 (Tex. 2000) (reversing certification of the
class in an action arising from an oil refinery fire that injured nearby residents and exposed them
to toxic gases, in an opinion by resigned U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, formerly of the
Texas Supreme Court (quoting Sun Coast Res., Inc. v. Cooper, 967 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tex. App.
1998))).
258. Id.
259. The requirements for class certification are found in TEX. R. Civ. P. 42.
260. Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398, 403 n.4 (Tex. 2000).
261. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
262. Id. at 42(a)(1) ("[T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.").
263. See Apartment Inv. & Mgmt. Co. v. Suggs & Assoc., 129 S.W.3d 250, 254 (Tex. App.
2004).
264. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(a)(2) ("[Tlhere are questions of law, or fact common to the class.").
265. Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Hankins, Il1 S.W.3d 69, 74 (Tex. 2003).
266. Health & Tennis Corp. of Am. v. Jackson, 928 S.W.2d 583, 590 (Tex. App. 1996).
267. Id.
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The requirement of typicality in Texas268 is met if the named
plaintiffs claims have the same essential characteristics as those of
the class.269 Moreover, these claims "need not be identical, only
substantially similar. '27°  It is enough if the claims arise from the
same pattern of conduct and are based on the same legal theory.27'
The requirement of adequacy of representation2 2 is established
if there are no conflicts of interest between the named plaintiff and
the class members and if the class counsel is sufficiently qualified
and experienced to prosecute the action vigorously.273 If there is any
doubt regarding the adequacy of a class representative, the Texas
trial court can easily rectify it by requiring additional class
representatives.274
In addition to these familiar requirements, plaintiffs must also
establish one of the following: (1) that making the plaintiffs bring
individual actions would create a risk of inconsistent judgments that
would interfere with the interests of other putative plaintiffs or
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendants; (2)
that declaratory or injunctive relief is appropriate because the
defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that generally
apply to the class; or (3) that common questions of law or fact
predominate over questions affecting individual plaintiffs and a class
action is the superior method for the fair and efficient resolution of
the controversy.275 If the plaintiff can satisfy at least one of these
standards, the court will apply their "rigorous approach" and
determine, in their discretion, whether to grant certification of the
class.276
268. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(3) ("[Tihe claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class.").
269. Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602, 613 (Tex. App. 1995).
270. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Kirkland, 917 S.W.2d 836, 842 (Tex. App. 1996).
271. Manning, 914S.W.2dat613.
272. TEX. R. CIv. P. 42(a)(4) ("[T]he representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.").
273. Health & Tennis Corp. of Am. v. Jackson, 928 S.W.2d 583, 589 (Tex. App. 1996).
274. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(1)(c) ("The court may order the naming of additional parties in
order to insure the adequacy of representation.").
275. Id. 42(b).
276. See Stobaugh v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 105 S.W.3d 302, 311-12 (Tex. App.
2003).
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2. Appellate Review of Class Certification
A Texas trial court decision that certifies or refuses to certify a
class is immediately subject to interlocutory appeal.277  While
pending, this appeal stays all other class action proceedings in the
trial court, including notice to the class or trial of the claims.2  Also,
this interlocutory appeal is strictly limited to the trial court's decision
regarding certification, and Texas appellate courts do not have
jurisdiction to review anything else, such as orders granting partial
summary judgment or the trial plan. 9
Interestingly, class certification orders are subject to two levels
of appellate review in Texas. In 2003, the Texas legislature decided
to grant the state supreme court jurisdiction to conduct interlocutory
review of class certification orders.28" Before 2003, a trial court's
order certifying a class could not be reviewed by the supreme court
until after a final judgment, unless there was a conflict of decisions
among the appellate courts or a dissenting opinion filed in the court
of appeals.2"' This limitation made the Texas Courts of Appeals
develop class action jurisprudence with little guidance from the state
supreme court. Now, however, a disappointed litigant has an
unqualified right to an interlocutory appeal of a decision on class
certification all the way to the state supreme court.282 This change
benefits defendants because it gives them an additional tactic to
defeat class certification. An order granting class certification can
have staggering economic consequences and often impels a
defendant to settle, while a denial of certification usually means that
the defendant will only face individual claims.
When reviewing a trial court's order granting certification, the
Texas Courts of Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court employ a
heightened standard beyond abuse of discretion. 283  The appellate
277. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN § 51.014(3) (Vernon 1997).
278. Id. § 51.014(b); ROSSMAN, supra note 116, at 286.
279. See Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 358-59 (Tex. 2001); Union
Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Hankins, 51 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex. App. 2001).
280. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(d) (Vernon 2004).
281. Hankins, 111 S.W.3d at 72.
282. TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(d) (Vernon 2004).
283. Compaq Computer Co. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 671 (Tex. 2004) ("Although we
review the trial court's order for abuse of discretion, we do not indulge every presumption in its
favor, as compliance with class action requirements must be demonstrated rather than
presumed.").
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courts expressly refuse to indulge every presumption in favor of the
trial court's ruling:
21 4
A trial court has discretion to rule on class certification
issues,, and some of its determinations-like those based on
its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, for example-
must be given the benefit of the doubt. But the trial court's
exercise of discretion cannot be supported by every
presumption that can be made in its favor." 5
Instead, compliance with class action requirements must be
demonstrated rather than presumed.21 6 Accordingly, the standards for
class certification in Texas are as "rigorous" as the state's own courts
proclaim them to be.2 7 The double layer of appellate review and the
heightened standard of review make class certification a higher
hurdle for Texas plaintiffs to overcome.
B. An Overview of the Texas Approach to
Complex Litigation
Unlike New York, Illinois, and Florida, Texas does not have a
business court for the adjudication of major and complex commercial
disputes. In addition, until fairly recently, Texas lacked a
mechanism to coordinate or consolidate cases pending in different
districts throughout the state. For years, Texas courts disfavored
multiple suits in order to encourage judicial economy and avoid
inconsistent judgments. 88  Nonetheless, courts realized that when
facing mass tort actions filed throughout the state-such as the breast
implant, diet drug, and Firestone tire litigations-the courts
detrimentally lacked a mechanism to bring coordinated discovery or
other proceedings before a single judge.2 9  Without such a
mechanism, individual courts risked creating duplicative or
inconsistent rulings.
284. Id.
285. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 691 (Tex. 2002).
286. Compaq Computer, 135 S.W.3d at 671.
287. Stobaugh v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 105 S.W.3d 302, 311 (Tex. App. 2003).
288. See Mark Herrmann et al., Get Ready for the New Texas MDL Statute, TEX. LAW., Sept.
1,2003.
289. See id.
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In response, the Texas legislature established a Multidistrict
Litigation Panel ("MDL") in 2003.29' Its coordination process
closely tracks the federal multidistrict litigation scheme that has
existed since 1968.21 The Texas MDL panel can transfer related
cases pending in trial courts in different counties across the state to a
single pretrial court for coordinated pretrial supervision.292 Cases are
considered related if they involve one or more common questions of
fact.293 The MDL panel may order transfer of such cases if it: (1) will
serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses; and (2) promote
the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.294 Once the pretrial
court concludes that the cases are ready for trial, it remands them
back to the original courts for trial in the parties' venue of choice.295
Texas courts now recognize the virtues of transferring related
cases to a single pretrial judge. One recent situation ripe for
coordination involved 453 plaintiffs that had filed 71 lawsuits in 55
different districts against 158 defendants.296 In the pre-MDL days,
trial judges were too busy to give complex litigation such as this the
deliberate, thoughtful, and consistent pretrial attention that they
deserved.297 Also, Texas trial judges traditionally set complex cases
for trial on dates before they were truly ready, in hopes that the case
would settle under the pressure of an impending trial.298 Now, after
implementing the Texas MDL, the pretrial judge will not return
complex cases to the trial judges until they are fully ready for trial.299
Thus, the pretrial judge can invest the necessary time and study
required by a complex case.
In order to have cases consolidated by the MDL panel, the
moving party must "simply" convince the panel "that transfer to a
290. See generally TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13 (discussing multidistrict litigation and the MDL).
291. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
292. See In re Hurricane Rita Evacuation Bus Fire, 216 S.W.3d 70, 71 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2006).
293. Id. Cases that share common questions of law do not justify transfer. The task of
assuring that uniform legal principles are applied to related cases belongs to the appellate courts.
See In re Ad Valorem Tax Litig., 216 S.W.3d 83, 85-86 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2006).
294. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.3.
295. See id. 13.7.
296. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 166 S.W.3d 3, 5 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2004).
297. See id. at 6.
298. See id.
299. See id.
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pretrial judge would promote . . . convenience and efficiency. "3
°
0
According to Justice Mack Kidd, the Texas legislature and Texas
Supreme Court originally intended to establish an "extremely
onerous burden of proof' to warrant MDL consolidation, since MDL
consolidation was viewed as a drastic change from the conventional
Texas civil justice system, in which a diverse group of judges across
the state brought their collective knowledge and experience to bear
on legal issues rather than assigning decisions to a single judge.
30 1
Justice Kidd also believes that MDL consolidation should be "an
extraordinary remedy," used only when Texas trial courts fail to
handle the caseload efficiently.302
In 2003, the MDL panel consolidated all asbestos cases to a
single, statewide asbestos judge. In his dissent to this order, Justice
Kidd reasoned that this was simply wrong.30 3 Texas courts had
already efficiently disposed of almost 30,000 asbestos cases through
the use of a series of agreed-upon standing pretrial orders and the
cooperation of counsel on both sides." By sharp contrast, Justice
Kidd believed that the federal experience with asbestos consolidation
had not been as smooth or successful.305 Justice Kidd concluded that
after all pretrial matters in federal asbestos cases were assigned to a
single federal district court, the docket suffered from "pretrial
paralysis" as dying victims had their cases "pretried" to death.30 6
Based on the Texas courts' prior success with disposing of asbestos
litigation, Justice Kidd found no need for Texas to assign all pretrial
matters to a single Texas judge.30 7 Justice Kidd concluded that
consolidation of the asbestos cases simply did not promote the just
and efficient result that the MDL panel strives for.308
300. In re Hurricane Rita Evacuation Bus Fire, 216 S.W.3d 70, 72 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2006).
301. In re Silica, 166 S.W.3d at 8, (Kidd, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 11.
303. See Union Carbide v. Adams, 166 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2003) (Kidd, J.,
dissenting).
304. Id. at 1.
305. See, e.g., In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1011
(2000) (describing negotiations of a global settlement of all asbestos claims that "fell apart" and a
seven year lapse in the global resolution of common questions of law or fact by the transferee
court).
306. Union Carbide, 166 S.W.3d at 2 (Kidd, J., dissenting).
307. Id.
308. Id.
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Indeed, a better use of the MDL panel is in litigation arising
from one common, tragic event, such as the bus carrying elderly
Hurricane Rita evacuees that caught fire in 2005.3"9 Consolidating
cases that arise from one common event and involve the same
witnesses and investigators better promotes Texas's goals of
convenience and efficiency.
C. New Developments in Class and Complex Litigation in Texas:
Civil Justice or Tort Reform?
In 2003, the Texas legislature believed that Texas fostered an
environment of excessive litigation.31° This environment purportedly
harmed consumers, caused companies to locate outside of Texas,
burdened Texas courts, and even forced some companies into
bankruptcy.311 In order to change Texas's reputation as a "plaintiff-
friendly state" and alleviate this perceived crisis, the legislature
passed a monumental and comprehensive bill full of "civil justice"
and "tort reform. 31 2 According to the bill's authors, their intent was
to bring more balance to the Texas civil justice system, reduce
litigation costs, and address the role of litigation in society.31 3 In
addition to creating the MDL panel and expanding the Texas
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review interlocutory appeals of class
certification orders, the bill addressed a large number of issues
implicated in class and complex litigation.3"4 Many of the bill's
reforms are tremendously advantageous to a corporate litigant
defending a class or complex lawsuit in Texas.
1. Eroding the "American Rule"
Among the many noteworthy changes in the law are new rules
that allow for the shifting of litigation costs, including attorney's
309. See In re Hurricane Rita Evacuation Bus Fire, 216 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2006).
310. H.R. 4, 78th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003).
311. See id.
312. Id. See Ralph Blumenthal, After Texas Caps Malpractice Awards, Doctors Rush to
Practice There, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, at A2 1.
313. S.R. 4, 78th Reg. Sess. at 1 (Tex. 2003).
314. The bill addressed class action lawsuits, offers of settlement, venue and forum non
conveniens, proportionate responsibility, products liability, prejudgment and post-judgment
interest, appeal bonds, seat belts and child safety seats, medical malpractice, charitable volunteer
immunity and liability, admissibility of evidence regarding nursing homes, and liability relating
to asbestos claims. Id.
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fees, when an offeree refuses his opponent's offer to settle and does
no better at trial. Under this new procedure, if a settlement offer is
made and rejected, and the ultimate judgment rendered by a court or
jury is significantly less favorable to the rejecting party than the offer
was, the rejecting party must pay the offeror's litigation costs," 5
including attorney and expert witness fees." 6 This change can make
the rejection of a settlement offer a costly decision and increases the
risks inherent in trying complex litigation.
This new procedure is clearly an erosion of the "American
Rule"-that parties bear the costs of their own attorney's fees in
litigation, regardless of whether they win or lose.3"7 The United
States has long rejected the "English Rule," followed in England and
most European nations, which makes the losing party pay the
winning party's attorney's fees.3"8 A preference for the "American
Rule" is premised on the traditional U.S. belief in liberal access to
the courts to redress wrongs." 9 The threat of paying the other side's
legal fees if the suit is unsuccessful is considered an unwanted
deterrent because of concerns that wrongs may go without redress.32
The Texas legislature felt it needed this drastic change in the law
to encourage settlements and avoid protracted litigation.321 Indeed,
this new rule encourages a more serious evaluation of a proposed
settlement at an earlier stage than otherwise might occur and can lead
to the disposition of cases before the heaviest expenses have been
incurred. Fee shifting of some kind is already common in a majority
of states and has been allowed in federal practice since 1938.322
315. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 42.004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Plaintiff pays
defendant's costs if judgment is less than 80 percent of defendant's settlement offer. Defendant
pays plaintiff's costs if judgment is more than 120 percent of plaintiffs settlement offer. Id. §
42.004(b).
316. "Litigation costs" is defined as money actually spent and obligations actually incurred
that are directly related to the case in which a settlement offer was made. It includes court costs,
reasonable fees for up to two testifying experts, and reasonable attorney's fees. Id. § 42.001(5).
317. See Elaine A. Carlson, Fee Shifting in Texas: Understanding the New Offer of Settlement
Practice, 7 J. TEX. CONSUMER L. 36, 37 (2003), available at http://www.jtexconsumerlaw.com/





322. Id. at 36. State laws vary with regards to what kinds of costs are recoverable and whether
cost-shifting is available to both plaintiffs and defendants. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
68 only allows the recovery of court costs, not attorney's fees, so there is little incentive to use it.
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Nonetheless, the need for such a rule is highly questionable.
There is no legal duty to settle a case before trial nor an obligation to
accurately predict the outcome of a suit. In many cases, especially in
class and complex litigation, it can be very difficult to predict a jury
verdict. Both sides can have reasonably different valuations of the
case and damage models. Thus, it seems illogical to have a
procedural rule that punishes parties who reasonably believed that
they would fare better at trial than by accepting a pretrial offer.
Since 95 percent of cases already settle before trial,323 the new
rule seems superfluous if its function is to encourage or promote
settlement offers. Alternative dispute resolution, mediation, and
sanction rules already exclude the majority of cases from their "day
in court." Accordingly, the new rule's actual purpose is probably to
give defendants an additional hammer to hold over plaintiffs, and it
will likely result in lower settlements. Though the cost-shifting rule
does not apply to class actions, it undoubtedly increases the risks
inherent in trying complex cases in Texas courts. Although the rule
will likely be an effective tool to encourage parties to settle their
lawsuits without bothering the courts, this efficiency comes at a high
cost to plaintiffs and will disproportionately affect plaintiffs of
limited means. It is easy to look back in hindsight and realize that a
settlement offer should have been taken, but such clarity is not
always apparent in the moment of decision. In a complex case in
which both parties reasonably differ as to the value of the case, it is
inherently unfair to make the winner pay the legal fees of the loser.
2. Reforming Appeal Bonds
Also of note and extremely advantageous to defendants,
especially in class actions where the liability can be astronomical, is
a reform in the amount of security needed to stay collection
proceedings while a defendant appeals a money judgment. Suppose
a jury finds a company liable for $50 million in compensatory
damages and $100 million in punitive damages. Naturally, the
company will want to appeal, especially the punitive damage award.
The mere filing of an appeal, however, does not prevent the winning
party from collecting the $150 million judgment. To stay the
It is rarely invoked and is considered ineffective. 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3001 (2d ed. 1997).
323. Carlson, Fee Shifting, supra note 317, at 38.
940
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collection and protect the company's assets from being seized while
the appeal is pending, the company must deposit with the court a
security interest called a supersedeas bond (appeal bond) that covers
the judgment, plus the interest that will accrue during the appeal.
324
In cases with giant verdicts, purchasing such an appeal bond may put
a severe strain on the company's resources, maybe even forcing it
into bankruptcy. If the company does not obtain a stay, however, the
plaintiff can pursue execution proceedings to collect the judgment
even while the appeal is underway.325
The history of Texas juries granting large damage awards made
the traditional requirement that an appeal bond cover the total
amount of damages unrealistic.326 For example, in the famous
Pennzoil v. Texaco327 case, a jury awarded a Texas-based oil
company over $10 billion in damages against a New York oil
company for tortiously interfering with a contract.32 The New York
company could not afford to buy a $10 billion appeal bond, and thus,
a serious cloud was cast on the company's future.329
Under the new rules adopted as part of the 2003 tort reforms, an
appeal bond must simply cover the compensatory damage award,
plus interest and costs. 30  Punitive damage awards, no matter how
large, need no longer be bonded.331 In addition, the maximum
amount required for an appeal bond is now capped at the lesser of
either $25 million or 50 percent of the defendant's net worth.332 The
new rules are also flexible: if the defendant can prove that
324. Timothy S. Bishop & Jeffrey W. Sarles, Supersedeas Bonds: A Crushing Burden, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 1, 1995, http://www.appellate.net/articles/supersedeas.asp. A supersedeas bond
traditionally serves two functions. First, it preserves the prejudgment status quo pending the
outcome of the appeal. Second, it provides security to the non-appealing party by insuring that if
the appellate court affirms the judgment, which could occur many years later, the winning party
will still have a source of recovery and will not be prevented from successfully collecting the
judgment. Kevin W. Liles, Comment, Supersedeas Bonds: The Ostensible Authority Struggle
over Who Gets a Reduction, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 469, 470 (1996).
325. See Howard J. Bashman, The Name's Bond, Supersedeas Bond, LAW.COM, June 26,
2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id = 1151053528412.
326. Bishop & Sarles, supra note 324.
327. 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (aff'd on abstention grounds).
328. id. at 4-6.
329. See id.
330. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006 (Vernon 2007).
331. Michael S. Hull et al., House Bill 4 and Proposition 12: An Analysis with Legislative
History, Part Two, 36 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 137 (2005).
332. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(b) (Vernon 2007).
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purchasing the bond will cause him or her "substantial economic
harm," the court must lower the security to a more agreeable
amount.333 This change should prevent astronomical Pennzoil-like
judgments from ever again precluding a defendant from staying a
judgment during appeal.
Setting a cap and integrating flexibility into the appeal bond
rules was a wise decision by Texas.334 There are several sound
arguments against requiring a defendant to post a bond in the full
amount of a judgment to secure an appeal, especially when the
judgment is extremely large. Judges and scholars have found that an
inflexible rule "denies an appellant's due process right to an effective
appeal" '335 and can amount to confiscation of the defendant's property
without due process.336 It also generates inequitable situations in
cases where the sheer size of the judgment effectively prohibits a
defendant from appealing because the defendant either cannot afford
the bond or a sufficient bond is simply not available. 37
Limiting the amount of the bond to compensatory damages,
however, creates a greater incentive for defendants to appeal damage
awards, especially punitive damage awards. Having more appeals
climb up the ladder increases the likelihood that large awards will be
reduced or overturned by a court of appeals.
3. Concerns over the Role of the Jury in
Class and Complex Litigation
Some of the 2003 tort reforms are probably attributable to an
outright fear of letting Texas juries decide cases. The fear that these
juries will misunderstand the facts and render an exorbitant verdict
against a corporate defendant explains why some of the reforms
noticeably chip away at a jury's power to have their say in class or
complex litigation. For example, the jury must now be unanimous in
333. Id. § 52.006(c).
334. For cases interpreting the new rule, see LMC Complete Auto., Inc. v. Burke, 229 S.W.3d
469 (Tex. App. 2007), Enviropower L.L.C. v. Bear, Steams & Co., No. 01-04-01111-CV, 2007
Tex. App. LEXIS 3692 (App. May 10, 2007), and Ramco Oil & Gas, Ltd. v. Anglo Dutch
(Tenge) L.L.C., 171 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. App. 2005).
335. Elaine A. Carlson, Mandatory Supersedeas Bond Requirements-A Denial of Due Process
Rights?, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 29, 39 (1987).
336. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1154 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
337. See, e.g., id.
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both the finding of liability and in the amount to be given in order to
award exemplary damages, which include punitive damages.338
Requiring unanimity makes this accord harder to reach. Also, Texas
now limits the awarding of non-economic damages in medical
malpractice cases to $250,000.339 Further, Texas passed a state
constitutional amendment that grants the legislature clear authority to
place further limits on non-economic damages in other kinds of
cases, if they choose to do so.34° The amendment was needed to
preclude expected constitutional challenges because arbitrary
damage caps implicate a number of constitutional issues.341
Though the legislature has not done so yet, plaintiffs' lawyers
fear that one day the Texas legislature will use its new authority to
extend damage caps to tort and contract claims.342 Establishing
damage caps raises important social questions: What does it mean
when a jury can sentence a criminal to death and take away his or her
individual life, but cannot decide the amount of damages an injured
victim should be awarded?343 Is the role of the jury in non-criminal
338. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(d) (Vernon 2007). Also, the jury must be
specifically instructed that an award of damages be unanimous. Id. § 41.003(e). See generally
Patricia F. Miller, Comment, 2003 Texas House Bill 4: Unanimous Exemplary Damage Awards
and Texas Civil Jury Instructions, 37 ST. MARY'S L.J. 515 (2006) (discussing the requirement of
jury unanimity).
339. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (Vernon 2007). For an interesting look at
the local impact of this legislation see Blumenthal, supra note 312. California also caps the
amount of non-economic damages at $250,000. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 2008).
340. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 66. The purpose of the amendment is to preclude any
constitutional challenges to the legislature's power to establish limits on non-economic damages.
341. Michael D. Johnston, Note, The Litigation Explosion, Proposed Reforms, and Their
Consequences, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 179, 192 (2007). Courts in other states have reached
inconsistent conclusions as to whether damage caps comport with their respective constitutional
doctrines. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of damage caps. Etheridge v.
Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 534 (Va. 1989). However, damage caps were found to violate
the Florida Constitution because they deprive a plaintiff of the right to a jury trial. Smith v. Dep't
of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088-89 (Fla. 1987). In Illinois, damage caps were held to be an
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine because they functioned as a
"legislative remittitur" and unduly encroached upon the traditional remittitur power of the
judiciary. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1080 (I11. 1997). President Clinton
called an unsuccessful effort by Senate Republicans to pass a federal damage cap "The Drunk
Drivers Protection Act of 1995" and asserted that it would also "protect rapists, child abusers ...
despoilers of the environment and even 'perpetrators of terrorist acts and hate crimes."' Neil A.
Lewis, Senate Republicans Halt Effort to Redo Civil Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at
Al.
342. See Michael S. Hull et al., supra note 331, at 166-67.
343. Round Table Discussion: Jury Service and the Jury System, HOUSTON LAW., available
at http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aasep05/page24.htm [hereinafter Round Table
Discussion].
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cases being usurped? Can juries still play a meaningful role in class
and complex litigation?
With the threat of the legislature extending damage caps to other
causes of action looming in the distance, there is an ongoing debate
in Texas about whether damage caps are proper. From a legislative
perspective, damage caps and the new unanimity requirement for
punitive damages suggest an overall legislative disapproval of jury
verdicts. Indeed, the Texas legislature had already limited punitive
damage awards.344 Taken together, these damage caps send the
message that the Texas legislature believes juries overly punish
defendants with presumed deep pockets and that juries are not
playing their proper role in the system. Apparently, a jury may
determine a defendant's fault but cannot be trusted to determine the
entire remedy of this fault. Tort reformers agree with this position
and defensibly argue that damage caps serve a greater purpose by
lowering insurance costs and reducing litigation.345 Indeed, of the
various tort reforms mentioned in this Article, damage caps are
probably the single greatest disincentive to filing a lawsuit.346
Even though damage caps are not fair to plaintiffs, some argue
they are necessary347 due to the disruption that large verdicts cause
within the business community. This line of reasoning is analogous
to that underlying workers' compensation law, where damages are
similarly cut off completely, except on a schedule, based on the
assumption that litigation over work-related injuries disrupts
industries and the workplace and is not economically efficient.34s
Naturally, consumer advocates strongly oppose the establishment of
further damage caps and fear that Texas's adoption of damage caps
sets a dangerous precedent for further limiting jury participation in
the process.349 Some argue that damage caps are really caps on
professional accountability, favoring wrongdoers over their
344. TEX. Ctv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (Vernon 2007). Exemplary damage
awards may not exceed an amount equal to the greater of: "(I)(A) two times the amount of
economic damages; plus (B) an amount equal to any noneconomic damages found by the jury,
not to exceed $750,000; or (2) $200,000." Id.
345. David E. Chamberlain, Texas Civil Justice Issues: A Look Back and a Look Forward, 70
TEX. BAR J. 63, 67 (2007).
346. Id.
347. See Round Table Discussion, supra note 343, at 33.
348. Id.
349. Chamberlain, supra note 345, at 67.
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victims.35 One Texas judge fears that establishing damage caps is a
slippery slope leading to a system where juries will not be needed at
all and all damages will be statutorily established and regulated. 5'
In complex litigation, there may be legitimate concerns that
support the need to avoid or circumvent the traditional role of the
jury. There is a widely held belief that jurors are not the best people
to decide complex technical aspects of cases involving intellectual
property issues, patents, or sophisticated business disputes.35 In
some cases, the stakes can be so high financially that some
companies consciously avoid using juries.35 3 They may fear that
jurors will decide against their company simply because jurors tend
to mistrust insurance or tobacco companies. Also, it may be too
financially risky in complex litigation to let twelve random people
decide the fate and fortune of a company since a jury decision is a
variable whose outcome cannot be predetermined.
The fear of letting juries decide the outcome of complex
litigation is exacerbated by the low turnout percentage of those who
are called to serve on juries in Texas. According to one complex
litigator, "we don't pick juries." '354  Instead, Texas juries are
composed of the first twelve leftovers, after both sides use their
strike privileges to dismiss potential jurors from the pool.355 In
evaluating these leftovers, commercial litigators fear that too few are
businesspeople who will understand the impact of their decision or
are citizens with a sufficient stake in the community.356 At the same
time, the higher someone is in the socioeconomic scale, the less
likely they are to serve on a jury.357
There are various reasons why people elect not to participate on
a jury. Some people avoid jury service because of economic reasons,
350. See TEX. WATCH, THE FALSE CHOICE: DOCTORS OR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE REAL
IMPACT OF SO-CALLED TORT "REFORM" IN TEXAS (2007), http://www.texaswatch.org/temp/
ts 4480F718-BOB9 50CE-FE9124F7FAODAB9D4880F728-BDB9-50CE-
FBA23E 195A556F63/MedMalUpdateO22007.pdf.
351. Round Table Discussion, supra note 343.
352. Id.
353. Gaynelle Griffin Jones, Litigation Counsel of Hewlett Packard Co., stated that "for a
company like HiP .. .we don't take advantage of the jury system for complex litigation. The
stakes are often too high financially." Round Table Discussion, supra note 343.
354. Id. at 27.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 25.
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i.e., they cannot afford to miss work.358 Others never show up
because they simply do not care.359 Some litigators even find this
apathy acceptable from a "natural selection" perspective: "If they
don't show up, if they don't care ... we don't want them anyway. "360
There is a sense that people who do not want to participate in the
process should not be compelled against their will since resentment
for being required to participate may cloud their reasoning.
Unfortunately, many people misunderstand the importance of
jury duty and how critical it is to citizenship.36" ' "Democracy is not a
spectator sport. It's participatory. '361 Jury duty is one important way
people can participate in the process and voice their opinion on
issues such as corporate misconduct and the proper role of class and
complex litigation in society. The general apathy toward jury
service, and even toward voting, is evidence of the fact that most
people do not appreciate their individual roles in their own
community or the importance of their state and federal citizenship.
The Texas legislature's conscious decision to place caps on non-
economic damages, though limited at this time to cases of medical
liability, expresses a lack of confidence in the ability of a jury to
adequately compensate an injured victim for the harm they may have
suffered.
The collapse of confidence in juror discretion demonstrates
serious issues that need to be rectified in the future. Like Illinois,
Texas needs to take affirmative steps to educate its citizens about the
proper role of litigation in their society, in order to counter the threat
of miseducation perpetuated by tort reformers. When the Texas jury
in a recent Vioxx case awarded a widow $253.5 million, the jury sent
a message to the pharmaceutical company it believed was
responsible for her husband's wrongful death. 63 When Texas's
requirement of proportionate punitive damages immediately reduced
the amount to $26.1 million, the legislature was in effect depriving
358. See Press Release, Sen. Jeff Wentworth, Tex. Senate, Texas Jurors Get Pay Increase
After 50 Years (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.wentworth.senate.state.tx.us/
pr05/c080505a.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Wentworth].




363. See Alex Berenson, Plaintiffs Find Payday Elusive in Vioxx Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2007, at Al.
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the jurors of their ability to voice their discontent with the
corporation's actions." Even though class and complex litigation
can involve large sums of money and create a risk that twelve
random individuals could bring great losses upon a national
corporation, excluding or limiting jury participation in the process is
inherently undemocratic. Denying jurors a real say in the process
will only lead to further juror disenchantment.
As a first step toward addressing this quagmire, Texas recently
increased the daily pay for jurors for the first time in 50 years.
Now, jurors are entitled to not less than $6 on the first day and $40
on each additional day, plus reasonable travel expenses.366 In theory,
this pay increase will inspire more Texans to participate in the jury
process.367 Unfortunately, this change is probably too late. Texas
already appears to believe that an arbitrary statute limiting damage
awards in medical cases to $250,000 can determine the correct
amount a victim deserves better than twelve human beings capable of
empathy and reason.
V. FLORIDA
A. An Overview of Florida's Class Action Standards: Undoing
"Judicial Hellhole" Status with Tougher Standards
Like Texas, Florida also now requires its trial courts to perform
a "rigorous analysis" before certifying a class action.368 This
requirement is perhaps a response to the reputation Florida has
earned as a "judicial hellhole. 3 69  Through cases like Liggett v.
Engle,37 Florida became known nationally for large damage awards
and plaintiff-friendly rulings that have attracted numerous class
action filings.37" ' Aggregating claims into a class action makes it
364. See id.
365. See TEX. GOV'T. CODE ANN. §61.001(a) (Vernon 2007).
366. Id.
367. Press Release, Wentworth, supra note 358.
368. Seminole County v. Tivoli Orlando Assocs. Ltd., 920 So. 2d 818, 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006).
369. See JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2007, supra note 181, at 5.
370. 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing a final judgment that awarded $12.7
million in compensatory damages to three individual plaintiffs and $145 billion in punitive
damages to the entire class).
371. See JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2007, supra note 181, at 5.
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more likely that a defendant will be found liable and have to pay a
significant damage award.372 Some class actions even become a form
of "legalized blackmail." '373  This scenario occurs when the
defendant's potential liability and litigation costs increase to the
point where it may be more economically prudent to abandon a
meritorious defense and settle.374
To prevent this from happening, Florida courts apply a "rigorous
analysis" to class action standards, whereby trial courts look beyond
the parties' pleadings and evaluate how the disputed issues might be
addressed on a class-wide basis.375 Even if a class becomes certified,
the order granting certification is certainly not definite, and Florida
courts are required to reassess their class rulings as the case
develops.376  In fact, state judges may alter or amend class
certification at any time before entry of a judgment on the merits.
This flexibility is understandable because a class is certified early in
litigation and often precedes substantial development of the issues
and facts.
In general, Florida's approach to class actions is more concerned
with pragmatism than consumer protection. The stated purpose of
allowing class actions in Florida is to provide litigants who share
common questions of law and fact an economically viable means of
addressing their needs in court.377 Unlike New York or Illinois,
where class actions are perceived as an effective vehicle of consumer
protection, in Florida there is a stronger concern for preventing
"legalized blackmail" than for discouraging "legalized theft" in the
marketplace.
1. Requirements for Class Certification
in Florida Courts
Class certification in Florida requires plaintiffs to plead and




375. Earnest v. Amoco Oil Co., 859 So. 2d 1255, 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (citing
Stone v. Composure Interactive Servs., Inc., 804 So. 2d 383, 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
376. Liggett Group v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
377. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Magnetic Imaging Sys., 694 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
Spring 2008] TORT REFORM, ONE STATE ATA TIME
typicality, and adequacy of representation.378 First, the plaintiff must
meet the numerosity requirement by demonstrating that "the
members of the class are so numerous that separate joinder of each
member is impracticable." '379 Florida courts tend to believe that a
lawsuit involving more than fifty plaintiffs makes joinder
impracticable, but the general test of impracticability is actually
whether the names and number of class members will be unstable.38°
If the lawsuit involves less than fifty potential plaintiffs, courts must
consider additional factors, including the judicial economy achieved
by avoiding multiple lawsuits, the geographic dispersion of the
plaintiffs, the financial resources of the plaintiffs, plaintiffs' ability to
file individual suits, and how requests for prospective relief may
affect the rights of other plaintiffs.38" '
Florida's primary concern regarding the commonality
requirement382 is whether the named plaintiffs claims arise from the
same course of conduct that gives rise to the class members' claims
and whether the claims are all based on the same legal theory.383 If
liability and damages depend on individual factual determinations,
then commonality will not be met.384
Florida's typicality requirement mandates that the named
plaintiffs claims be typical of the class members' claims.8 Merely
pointing to common issues of law is not sufficient if the facts
necessary to prove the claims are markedly different.386
The adequacy of representation requirement387 serves to uncover
conflicts of interest between the named plaintiff and class
378. Seminole County v. Tivoli Orlando Ass'n, 920 So. 2d 818, 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220 governs class actions in Florida courts.
379. Braun v. Campbell, 827 So. 2d 261, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
380. See id.
381. Id.
382. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(2) ("[T]he claim or defense of the representative party raises
questions of law or fact common to the questions of law or fact raised by the claim or defense of
each member of the class.").
383. Braun, 827 So. 2d at 267.
384. Id.
385. FLA. R. C1v. P. 1.220(a)(3) ("[T]he claim or defense of the representative party is typical
of the claim or defense of each member of the class."); Braun, 827 So. 2d at 267.
386. Braun, 827 So. 2d at 267.
387. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(4) ("[T]he representative party can fairly and adequately protect
and represent the interests of each member of the class.").
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members.388 The requirement is met when the named plaintiff is a
part of the class, possesses the same interest, and suffers the same
injury as the other class members." 9 Also, the named plaintiff must
possess undivided loyalties to the absent class members.39 This
requirement ensures that the interests of each class member are fairly
and adequately protected.39'
In addition to these four threshold requirements, Florida class
action plaintiffs must also establish that their lawsuit is at least one of
three potential types of class actions.3 92 The first type of class action
requires a showing that individual claims would create incompatible
standards of conduct or be dispositive toward the interests of other
putative plaintiffs not part of the class.393 The second type of class
action, known as "ground certification," requires a showing that the
defendants acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable
to all class members, thereby making injunctive or declaratory relief
appropriate.394  This type of class action truly depends on
homogeneity of claims and interests.395 The third type of class action
requires a predominance inquiry, showing that questions of law or
fact common to the class predominate over questions that only affect
individuals.396 This predominance inquiry is basically a balancing
test. The court balances the value of allowing individual actions that
protect each person's own interests against the judicial economy
achieved by resolving the issues as a class action.397
This predominance requirement is far more demanding than the
commonality requirement.398 For example, in a case against tobacco
companies, Florida found that personal smoking behavior is too
individualized for common questions to predominate.399 However,
388. Braun, 827 So. 2d at 268.
389. Freedom Life Ins. Co. v. Wallant, 891 So. 2d 1109, 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Braun, 827 So. 2d at 268.
393. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(1); Earnest v. Amoco Oil Co., 859 So. 2d 1255, 1257 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
394. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(2); Freedom Life, 891 So. 2d at 1117.
395. 891 So. 2d at 1117.
396. See FLA. R. CIrv. P. 1.220(b)(3); Earnest v. Amoco Oil Co., 859 So. 2d 1255, 1257-58
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
397. See 859 So. 2d at 1258.
398. Freedom Life, 891 So. 2d at 1119.
399. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Hines, 883 So. 2d 292, 295 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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individualized damage issues are considered acceptable and do not
prevent a finding of predominance.4"0
Florida's class action standards also require that class
representation be superior to other available methods to fairly and
efficiently adjudicate the claims presented.4"' If significant
individual issues exist, then "little value is gained by proceeding as a
class action."4 2 Moreover, it would be considered unjust to continue
as a class action because a negative outcome would unfairly bind
absent class members with individualized issues.4 3  In such
circumstances, a class action will not meet Florida's standards for
superiority.4 4
2. Appellate Review of Class Certification
Florida trial courts may certify a class action only after
determining through rigorous analysis that the above elements of a
class action have been met. 5 To achieve certification, a plaintiff
must do more than merely plead the language of the statute. 6 The
plaintiff has a heavy burden to prove all the elements of a class
action through the presentation of affidavits, testimony, and other
evidence in a formal hearing.0 7
Like the other states examined in this Article, Florida also
allows immediate interlocutory appeal of an order granting or
denying class certification.0 8 The determination of certification is
within the trial court's discretion and will only be reversed on appeal
if an abuse of discretion is shown.40 9 The Florida Courts of Appeal
do not have jurisdiction to review other rulings or orders not listed
within their rules, such as a motion to amend the complaint to add
400. Freedom Life, 891 So. 2d at 1119.




405. Seminole County v. Tivoli Orlando Assoc., 920 So. 2d 818, 823-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
406. Id. at 822.
407. See id. at 824.
408. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a) governs the interlocutory appeals of class certification orders.
409. Pinellas County Sch. Bd. v. Crowley, 911 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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punitive damages or findings involving the enforcement of a
previously approved settlement agreement.41 °
B. Florida's Complex Business Litigation Courts
After ten years of lobbying, the Business Law Section of the
Florida Bar finally convinced Florida to establish complex business
litigation courts.4 1' These courts specialize in handling complex
business cases, such as antitrust suits, intellectual property cases,
franchise cases, and unfair competition cases.412 They generally hear
disputes where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the
case presents contract or tort issues of a business nature. 3
Florida's complex business litigation courts are widely praised
by both the local bar and the business community for their expedient
dockets and the specialized attention they provide to high-stakes
cases.414 Cases filed in these courts are generally scheduled for trial
within two years.45 Cases that previously took three to five years to
resolve in regular trial courts are now concluded in fourteen to
twenty-two months. 416  This efficiency is possible because of the
unique features of the complex business litigation courts. For every
case filed, the courts enter a scheduling and trial order early in the
proceedings, similar to those entered by federal courts.4 17
Additionally, each court has a law clerk and case managers to make
sure matters are heard and tried effectively in a short time frame.418
There are now three complex business litigation courts in
Florida. The first was established in 2003 in the Ninth Judicial
410. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a); see, e.g., Faulk v. Air Prod. & Chem., 798 So. 2d 820, 821
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Phillip Morris v. Jett, 802 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
411. Section Heralds New Business Litigation Court, FLA. BAR NEWS, July 15, 2003, at 7,
available at http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews0l.nsf/
cb53c80c8fabd49d85256b5900678f6c/4b6b79e 19f6eff7985256d5f004c8f90?OpenDocument.
412. Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida, Complex Business Litigation Court Homepage,
http://www.ninja9.org/Courts/Business/Index-BC.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
413. Bus. LAW SECTION OF THE FLA. BAR, BUSINESS COURT NEWS AND INTRODUCTION,
http://flabuslaw.org/index.php?//list.courts=4/1 (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
414. See id.
415. Id.
416. Jill Krueger, Bill Would Expand Local Business Court to II More Counties, ORLANDO
Bus. J., Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://orlando.bizjournals.conorlando/stories/2007/02/05/
story3.html.
417. Bus. LAW SECTION OF THE FLA. BAR, supra note 413.
418. Id.
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Circuit in Orange County, which includes Orlando.4"9 Two more
complex business litigation courts took effect in January of 2007, in
Miami and Tampa.4 2' Additional business courts are expected in
Jacksonville and Fort Lauderdale in the near future.421
Florida hopes these specialized business courts will draw large
companies to the state.422 In theory, these courts could make Florida
a more attractive place to do business by removing some of the legal
uncertainties of complex litigation.423 A court that hears issues that
repeatedly arise in business litigation can develop a predictable body
of business law. Litigants and their attorneys can apply these
principles of law to their cases and have a better sense of future
results.424 With a single judge hearing business cases, local attorneys
will learn how the judge is likely to rule on certain issues-which
may prevent lawsuits from even being filed.4 25 Adding certainty and
predictability to how the court will rule also helps promote early
settlement and reduces the time and costs of complex litigation.
Businesses will also likely be attracted to the emphasis Florida's
business courts place on alternative dispute resolution, pre-trial
settlement, and the proactive role the judges take in managing
cases.
426
As an additional incentive, litigants in the complex business
litigation court in Orange County have at their disposal a state-of-
the-art high-tech courtroom. 427 This courtroom offers numerous flat-
screen monitors strategically placed throughout the courtroom.
42
Courtroom participants may view the presentation of evidence,
419. Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida, supra note 412.
420. BUS. LAW SECTION OF THE FLA. BAR, supra note 413.
421. Id.; see also Krueger, supra note 416 (discussing the introduction of legislation to further
increase the number of business courts in Florida).
422. See Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida, supra note 412.
423. NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF FLA., BUSINESS COURT INFORMATION BROCHURE
4 (2004), available at http://www.ninja9.org/Courts/Business/Forms/BCBrochure.pdf [hereinafter
BUSINESS COURT BROCHURE].
424. See id.
425. Ken Ibold, A New Court in Orlando Will Handle Strictly Business Disputes, FLA.
TREND, Sept. 2, 2003, available at http://www.ninja9.org/CourtslBusiness/NewsFloridaTrend-9-
02-2003.PDF.
426. See BUSINESS COURT BROCHURE, supra note 423, at 4.
427. See id. at 3-4.
428. Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida, Technology: Courtroom 23+, http://
www.ninja9.org/Courts/Business/Index-BC.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
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videoconference testimony of remote witnesses, and real-time court
reporting on these monitors.4 9 The jury box alone has ten monitors,
to allow for easy viewing.430
Concerns voiced in other states that business courts provide a
two-tiered system of justice, one for the rich and one for the average
citizen,43' have not been adequately addressed in Florida. This
situation is unsurprising, since Florida's business courts were created
to cater to large corporations, not local small businesses. In fact,
after local bar members complained that small businesses were
clogging the docket of Orange County's complex business litigation
court, the minimum amount in controversy was raised from $15,000
to $150,000.432 However, it has since been lowered to its current
level of $75,000.
433
The desire to exclude small-level business disputes from the
docket is understandable since Florida's stated purpose in
establishing business courts is to provide economic stimulus to the
community by drawing big businesses to relocate to Florida.434
Florida wants to present itself as sophisticated enough for the
supposedly high-level litigation that large companies need and
promote the notion that business cases in Florida will be treated with
the same level of sophistication that would be found in New York. 35
Nonetheless, Florida has a long way to go if it wants to remake itself
as the new Delaware, where businesses are drawn to incorporate in
part because of the wealth of corporate case law and opinions from
Delaware's Court of Chancery.436
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Elaine R. Friedman, New Business Courts Gain Acceptance, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 1, 1997, at
B1.
432. Jill Krueger, Big Changes Being Made to Biz Court, ORLANDO BUS. J., Sept. 30, 2005,
available at http://orlando.bizjoumals.com/orlando/stories/2005/10/03/story I .html.
433. Amended Order Governing Complex Business Litigation Court Procedures and Criteria,
No. 2003-17-04, available at http://www.ninja9.org/Courts/Business/index-BC.htm.
434. See Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida, supra note 412.
435. Becky Knapp, Business Court on the Docket, ORLANDO Bus. J., Mar. 21, 2003,
available at http://orlando.bizjournals.com/orlando/stories/2003/03/24/story2.html.
436. See id.
Spring 2008] TORT REFORM, ONE STATE ATA TIME
C. New Developments in Class and Complex
Litigation in Florida
1. International Arbitration
One of the alternative methods for resolving complex litigation
is through arbitration. Some companies may prefer to resolve
complex lawsuits through arbitration because of the perception that
arbitration is more efficient and less costly than formal litigation.437
Arbitration is often praised because of its flexible procedures and
private proceedings.438  These circumstances are distinct from
traditional litigation, where the proceedings become a matter of
public record. In addition, an arbitration award in international
business cases may in fact be more binding than a state court's
judicial ruling since international arbitration relies on widely
recognized treaties like the Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration and the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.439 On the
other hand, because arbitration is a contractual method of dispute
resolution, international arbitration by definition also has inherent
consolidation and joinder issues." In complex cases involving many
parties, not every defendant may be willing to consent to arbitration,
which could be troubling.44" '
In light of the above considerations, Florida recently revised its
laws on multijurisdictional practice to facilitate the state's rising
position as a destination for international arbitrations. According to
some legal experts, Miami is now second to New York City as the
437. Julia Neyman, Litigation Alternative Gaining in Popularity, S. FLA. Bus. J., Mar. 2,
2007, available at http://southflorida.bizjoumals.com/southflorida/stories/2007/03/05/story7.html
[hereinafter Neyman, Alternative].
438. Julia Neyman, Arbitration Transcends International Boundaries, S. FLA. BUS. J., Oct.
27, 2006, available at http://southflorida.bizjoumals.com/southflorida/stories/2006/10/
30/story 1.html [hereinafter Neyman, Boundaries].
439. Id.; Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245; Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517,
330 U.N.T.S. 3.
440. For a more in-depth explanation of the issues arising in multiparty disputes in
international arbitration, see Winston Stromberg, Recent Development, Avoiding the Full Court
Press: International Commercial Arbitration and Other Global Alternative Dispute Resolution
Processes, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV 1337 (2007).
441. See id.
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most popular destination for international arbitration.142  For many
years, Miami has increasingly become a preferred location for
arbitration hearings, especially among corporations doing business in
Central and South American countries. 443 As the political climate in
Latin America continues to destabilize, global companies view
corrupt courts and leftist regimes as threats to their business interests.
Miami is often seen as a neutral and logical place to arbitrate
complex disputes.44
To facilitate the use of Miami as a destination for international
arbitration, the Florida Bar adopted new rules in 2006 that allow out-
of-state attorneys to appear in an unlimited number of international
arbitrations in Florida. 45  Before, out-of-state attorneys could only
make three pro hac vice appearances in Florida.446 Now, out-of-state
attorneys can participate in an unlimited number of international
arbitrations in Florida. Under the new Florida law, international
arbitrations encompass proceedings where the underlying subject
matter of the dispute involves property located outside the U.S.,
relates to a contract that envisages performance outside the U.S.,
involves international investment, relates to one or more foreign
countries, or involves a foreign state . 47  However, out-of-state
attorneys cannot appear in Florida courts to confirm or vacate the
awards received in these international arbitrations without following
the state's procedures for pro hac vice admission. 48
These new rules are designed to encourage parties to choose
Florida as a location for international arbitrations.449
Multijurisdictional practice is now becoming more in demand as
businesses expand their operations into other states and require legal
advice and services in jurisdictions where their regular attorneys are
not admitted to practice law.45' Florida hopes its new rules will make
442. Neyman, Alternative, supra note 437.
443. Neyman, Boundaries, supra note 438.
444. Neyman, Alternative, supra note 437.
445. See FLA. BAR REG. R. 1-3.11 (2007).
446. Christopher Bopst & Stanley A. Beiley, Florida's New Rules on Multijurisdictional
Practice: A Mixed Bag for Arbitration Attorneys, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2005, at 38.
447. See FLA. BAR REG. R. 1-3.11 (2007) (the definition of international arbitration appears in
the comment following the Rule).
448. Bopst & Beiley, supra note 446, at 38.
449. See id.
450. Id. at 36.
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its multijurisdictional standards more consistent with modem
business practices.45' Illinois and New York already allow out-of-
state attorneys to appear in arbitration proceedings without violating
their respective rules against the unauthorized practice of law.452
Florida has not completely joined these states because appearances
by non-Florida attorneys for domestic arbitrations are still limited to
three pro hac vice appearances per year.4  Nonetheless, the new
openness to appearances by out-of-state attorneys in international
arbitrations is an interesting development in Florida law, likely to
have an important impact on the local legal community.
2. Class Action Reform
Florida's courts were once open to out-of-state residents in the
same way Florida's beaches and theme parks were. However, some
recent legislation imposes more stringent restrictions on when out-of-
state residents can be members of a class action filed in a Florida
court. According to a new law passed in 2006, class membership in
any Florida class action is now exclusively limited to Florida
residents only, with a few narrow exceptions.454 The first exception
allows nonresidents to participate in a class action filed in Florida if
their claim would be recognized within their own state, the claim is
not time-barred, and they would be unable to bring the claim in their
own state because their state of residence lacks personal jurisdiction
over the defendants.455 The second exception allows a class action to
include nonresidents if the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred
in or emanated from Florida.456 The new law also does not affect
class action lawsuits involving federal or state civil rights laws.457
Nonetheless, the new law will likely achieve its intended effect
of precluding Florida courts from hearing nationwide class actions.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 38. See, e.g., Colmar v. Fremantlemedia N. Am., Inc., 801 N.E.2d 1017 (111. App.
Ct. 2003) (holding that out-of-state attorney's representation of an out-of-state client during
arbitration in Illinois had no effect on the arbitration award); Williamson v. John D. Quinn
Constr. Corp, 537 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that a New Jersey law firm, not
licensed in New York, could be paid for legal representation in a New York arbitration).
453. Bopst & Beiley, supra note 446, at 36.
454. FLA. STAT. § 768.734 (2008).
455. See id. § 768.734(l)(b)(1).
456. See id. § 768.734(1)(b)(2).
457. Seeid. § 768.734(3).
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This new law certainly complements CAFA and the national trend
toward removing cases of national importance to federal courts.
Florida lawmakers considered several of CAFA's congressional
findings on state courts mishandling class actions as justification for
this change in Florida law. 58 These findings included the perceived
bias in national class actions toward out-of-state defendants and the
federalism issues implicated when the courts of one state impose
their view on the law of another state, binding the rights of another
state's residents.459
Restricting membership to Florida residents is certainly not
unprecedented. In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle,46° a class of
more than a million members was restricted to Florida residents
because of the unwarranted burden that the case threatened to place
on state judicial resources and Florida taxpayers.461 Although it is
too soon to demonstrate its effects empirically, Florida's new
restrictions on nonresident membership in class actions may still
negatively impact the Florida court system. While the new law will
certainly reduce the number of complex class actions involving large
numbers of nonresidents, it may also increase the number of suits
brought by nonresidents as individual actions.462
Other states contemplating reform of their own laws to exclude
nonresidents from class actions should note that Florida's new law
may be susceptible to a number of constitutional challenges. First,
limiting state courts to resident plaintiffs in a class action implicates
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the U.S.
Constitution.463 The Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibits
discrimination by states against nonresidents when there is no
substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that
they are citizens of other states, unless there are valid reasons for the
disparity of treatment." If Florida's restrictions on nonresidents
participating in class actions are challenged on this ground, Florida
458. See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF ANALYSIS, JUSTICE COUNCIL COMMITTEE,
H.R. 7259, at 4 (Fla. 2006) [hereinafter STAFF ANALYSIS].
459. Id.
460. 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
461. Id. at 41.
462. See STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 458, at 6.
463. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
464. Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 67 (1988).
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will have to present "substantial reasons" for the difference in
treatment and show that the discrimination against nonresidents bears
a substantial relationship to the state's objective.465 Florida may be
able to point to the policy reasons for adopting CAFA as similar
substantial reasons for the difference in treatment, but it is
questionable how the Florida Supreme Court will rule on the issue.466
The new law also implicates plaintiffs' fundamental right to
access the courts.467 This right is protected in both the Florida and
Federal Constitutions and limits the ability of legislatures to unduly
or unreasonably burden or restrict access to state courts.4 68 However,
the new law still allows nonresidents the ability to file individual
actions in Florida and does not limit the ability of nonresidents to file
separate class actions in their own states.469 Moreover, federal courts
are now more available to hear class actions involving nonresident
members, at least in theory, since CAFA has broadened their
jurisdiction. Accordingly, Florida's new law will likely survive a
challenge on this ground.
Lastly, Florida's new law could implicate the separation of
powers doctrine in the Florida Constitution.47" The Florida
legislature is vested with "legislative power" and the ability to define
substantive rights, while the Florida Supreme Court is vested with
the power to adopt procedural rules for the courts.47' Procedural
rules, which may be implicated in the new law, include all rules that
govern the parties.472 If the new limits on class membership are
determined to be procedural rather than substantive, the legislature's
465. See id.
466. See STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 458, at 7.
467. Id.
468. According to Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution: "The courts shall be open
to every persons for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. The U.S. Constitution does not contain a specific clause
providing for the right of access to courts, but the Supreme Court has held that there is such a
qualified right arising from the Due Process Clause. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
377 (1971) ("[D]ue process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of
overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial
process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.").
469. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 458, at 7.
470. Id. at 8. Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides: "No person belonging
to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless
expressly provided herein." FLA. CONST. art. II, §3.
471. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that legislative power is vested in the legislature).
472. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 458, at 8.
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actions could be viewed as an encroachment on the courts'
responsibilities. 3  On the other hand, the law's title, "Capacity to
Sue," could contemplate the absence of a legal disability. Namely,
the law could deprive a party of the right to come into court, which
would be considered a substantive right. It appears arguable
whether the new law should be considered procedural or substantive
in nature, and it is unclear if the law will survive a separation of
powers challenge.
Supporters of the new law claimed it would save taxpayers
money by reducing the size and number of class actions filed in
Florida. 475 This claim may be true, but the real impetus for the law is
more likely the growing national trend toward narrowing the scope
of permissible class action claims.4 6 Like Illinois, Florida is likely
troubled by its designation as a "judicial hellhole" and would like to
rectify its image as an overly plaintiff-friendly state.477  The new
limits on class action membership are a major step in this direction.
3. Abolishing Joint and Several Liability
Being perceived as a plaintiff-friendly state is apparently bad for
business. A state's legal environment and friendliness to plaintiffs is
one of several important criteria in the relocation of large
companies. 478  To make Florida more attractive to the business
community, Florida recently abolished the last vestiges of joint and
several liability in apportioning negligence damages in favor of a
comparative fault approach 9.4  By doing so, Florida now joins its
neighbors-Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana-which have
already abolished joint and several liability as an incentive to attract
new businesses to relocate to the region.
48
473. Francis X. Rapprich III & Christopher M. Harne, Cutting Classes: Florida Tightens its
Restrictions on Class Action Lawsuits, FLA. BAR J., Mar. 2007, at 9, 12.
474. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 458, at 8.
475. Rapprich & Harne, supra note 473, at 12.
476. See id.
477. See JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2006, supra note 179, at 13.
478. Kirstin Dorsch, Tort Reform Advocates Will Monitor Impact, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J.,
Apr. 7, 2006, available at http://jacksonville.bizjoumals.com/jacksonville/stories/2006/04/IO/
story8.html.
479. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West 2008).
480. Dorsch, supra note 478.
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In its purest form, joint and several liability makes each
defendant at fault individually liable for the entire judgment awarded
to the plaintiff in a negligence action, regardless of each individual
defendant's percentage of fault.48' It effectively makes each
defendant a guarantor of all tortfeasors' obligations, allowing the
plaintiff to recover from one or any combination of defendants at
fault.48 Supporters of the rule argue that it is necessary because it
upholds the compensatory goal of our tort system by ensuring that
plaintiffs are "fully and adequately" compensated.4"3 According to
the theory, the rule is also fair because defendants are considered to
be in a better position to spread the costs and risks of an insolvent
defendant's liability.
484
Naturally, the insurance industry strongly opposes these policy
arguments. The Florida Association of Insurance Agents maintained
that joint and several liability converted lawsuits into quests for
financially viable "deep-pocket" defendants.48  Even if these
defendants were minimally at fault for the underlying injury, they
would effectively be forced to settle the lawsuit out of court to avoid
being responsible for the entire damage award.486 The defense bar
believed that there was a longstanding litigation "lottery" mentality
prevailing in the Florida courts because plaintiffs' attorneys sought
to target defendants with deep pockets. 487 Resentment over the rule
has been brewing in Florida for many years, especially after the oft-
cited case of Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood.488 There, Disney
World was found to be 1 percent at fault, the plaintiff 14 percent at
fault, and another person 85 percent at fault, yet the plaintiff was
entitled to collect the entire award from Disney.489
481. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 458, at 1.
482. Id.
483. See Clare Elizabeth Krumlauf, Note, Ohio's New Modified Joint and Several Liability
Laws: A Fair Compromise for Competing Parties and Public Policy Interests, 53 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 333, 336 (2006).
484. See id.
485. Dave Kaiser, Industry Cheers as Florida Repeals Joint and Several Liability, INS. J.,




488. 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).
489. Id. at 199.
962 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW [Vol.41:899
However, proponents of joint and several liability argue that the
ban still hurts taxpayers and the state because unpaid accident costs
fall upon the victim and ultimately the state in higher Medicaid
costs.49 Also, the rule of joint and several liability did not appear to
stop companies from relocating to and doing business in Florida
prior to the ban.49 So, there may be some faulty analysis and
reasoning supporting Florida's decision in this matter.
Nonetheless, by abolishing joint and several liability, the Florida
legislature hoped to send a statement to companies throughout the
country that Florida is open for business.492 The state legislature is
convinced that a state's economic development is closely tied to its
litigation environment.493 In hopes of undoing their reputation as a
"judicial hellhole," Florida is following the national trend of enacting
tort reform. Like Texas, Florida has placed caps on non-economic
damages in medical malpractice suits494 and the amount necessary to
secure an appeal bond.495 Every tort reform enacted, from limiting
class actions to abolishing joint and several liability, provides an
additional arrow in the quiver of economic recruiters.496
VI. CONCLUSION
Like many other states, New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida
all find themselves in a difficult predicament. On one hand, states
have a duty to protect consumers and discourage businesses from
engaging in actions that threaten or harm large groups of people. On
the other hand, states are under tremendous pressure from the
business community to enact tort reforms that limit business liability
and preserve the economic activity that benefits all of society. Each
state handles this difficult task of balancing competing interests in its
own way.
It is fortunate for the nation that each state has the freedom to
adopt its own standards and procedures for handling class and
490. Dorsch, supra note 478.
491. Id.
492. See Governor Signs Repeal of Joint and Several Liability Law, S. FLA. BUS. J., Apr. 27,
2006, available at http:l/jacksonville.bizjoumals.com/southflorida/stories/2006/04/24/
daily48.html.
493. See Kaiser, supra note 485.
494. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.118 (West Supp. 2007).
495. See id. § 45.045.
496. See id.
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complex litigation. Each state can act as a mini-laboratory,4 97
experimenting with different amounts of tort reform, consumer
protection, and due process considerations. Each state can examine
the results of other states' efforts and consider what standards are
most effective for achieving the balancing of interests that state
courts struggle with every day when deciding class and complex
litigation.
Perhaps the best way to understand the difficult predicament in
which states find themselves in is to consider a swinging pendulum.
The pendulum can swing either way, toward protecting the due
process rights of consumers and discouraging "legalized theft" or in
the opposite direction, toward protecting the due process rights of
defendant corporations and inhibiting "legalized blackmail." The
underlying message implied in CAFA-that state courts are abusing
the class action vehicle-has not gone unnoticed and is encouraging
state courts and legislatures to swing the pendulum toward enacting
further tort reforms. It remains to be seen how far the pendulum will
swing.
497. The metaphor of states as democratic laboratories is not novel. See New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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